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This article describes the processes involving the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office's (PTO's) implementation of administrative patent
levers related to business methods. Administrative patent levers are
conceptualized in this article as rules that represent a coordinated policy
at the PTO to target a particular technology class, are often motivated by
signals sent by actors within all three branches of government, and can
be explained by positive political theory. This article presents an account
where policymakers in all branches of government reacted strongly to the
dangers posed by business method patents. The PTO's behavior is
explained under the "fire-alarm" theory of regulatory change, whereby
an administrative agency responds to external institutional pressures and
actors. This conceptual analysis of administrative patent levers is then
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informed by a detailed analysis of business method rules that fall under
this category of administrative policymaking at the PTO.
A descriptive account is then offered that predicts how the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) would review the
PTO's use of administrative patent levers. Ultimately, the CAFC's likely
approach is undesirable because it fails to recognize that the PTO
engages in policymaking. A normative solution is offered whereby the
reviewing courts would apply a "hard look" review under Section
706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act. This standard would
require that the PTO offer objective evidence that any administrative
patent levers are warranted. This standard would also require that the
PTO address any valid arguments or evidence against the
implementation of such technology-specific and policy-oriented rules.
Under this line of analysis, it is proposed that current business method
administrative patent levers would fail to meet this standard of review.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The press has cited examples of questionable patents including those
for peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, golf swings, and gene-related
inventions. Certainly, Congress should not legislate in a way that
throws the baby out with the bath water. I am pleased to hear about
all the developments.., including the steps that the [U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office] has taken to tighten its review process to improve
the examination of these applications and thus increase the quality of
issued patents, especially in the area of business patents.I
In 2011, patent reform took the center stage of national policy
debates.2 On March 8th of that year, the U.S. Congress passed The
America Invents Act, a comprehensive bill to reform The Patent Act of
1952 (the "Patent Act"), and President Obama signed the legislation into
law on September 16, 2011. 3  This legislative overhaul has been
described as the most significant patent reform achieved in 60 years.4 In
prior years, the legislature introduced bills that would have transformed
1. Business Method Patents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Prop., Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (opening statement
of Rep. Howard Coble, Chairman, Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the
Internet, Comm. on the Judiciary).
2. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Senators to Debate Patent Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2011, available at http://nyti.ms/gTTBKK.
3. The Senate enacted the America Invents Act, S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011)
(enacted), by a vote of 95 to 5. The House likewise passed a similar version, the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act. See H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011). Among the important
changes to patent law made by the America Invents Act is a first-to-file system, broader
ability for third parties to challenge issued patents, a provision to eliminate certain
business method tax patents, and the ending of "fee diversion" so that the PTO may keep
the fees it collects from operations.
4. Press Release, Sen. Chris Coons, Statement on Successful Cloture Vote on the
America Invents Act (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://bit.ly/NsKGm9.
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patent law.5 These various bills, however, consistently failed due to the
6conflicting patent goals held by various industry constituents.
As will be demonstrated in this article, the complex dynamics of
patent reform extend far beyond the legislature enacting statutory
changes. The judiciary, for example, stepped in recently to fill the void
created by legislative inertia and modified various substantive aspects of
patent law.7 There is an additional element of patent reform, however,
5. There have been multiple instances where the legislature tried but failed to
institute patent reforms. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, H.R. 1908, 110th
Cong. (2007) (among this Act's major provisions were: first-to-file rights; provisions to
facilitate filing a patent application without inventor cooperation; limitation of damages
to the economic value of the improvement; limitations on when damages may be trebled
for willfulness; post-grant opposition proceedings and venue limitations); Carl E.
Gulbrandsen et al., Patent Reform Should Not Leave Innovation Behind, 8 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 328 (2009) (describing the many patent-related congressional bills
that have been proposed in the past).
6. See David Orozco & James G. Conley, Friends of the Court: Using Amicus
Briefs to Identify Corporate Advocacy Positions in Supreme Court Patent Litigation,
2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 107 (2011) (discussing how corporations with differing
attributes, such as size and patent capabilities, advocate for different patent law
outcomes). This gridlock scenario was recently portrayed in the following manner by
one legislator:
Whatever the fate of patent reform in the coming weeks, we can all agree that
Congress has found it difficult to enact a truly comprehensive reform bill.
Why? The answer is twofold. First, different versions of the legislation have
addressed many core provisions of the Patent Act. And second, a number of
different stakeholders use the patent system in different ways. Businesses that
devote significant resources on research and development have a greater
financial need for patent protection than those spending less on R&D. In
addition, some companies may generate one or two clearly understood patents
that define an entire product while others, in the software or tech realms, may
develop products that contain hundreds or even thousands of patents. In
addition, many industries practice their patent portfolio defensively while other
industries and patent-holding companies tend to go on the offensive to pursue
their patent rights.
Review of Recent Judicial Decisions on Patent Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, Subcomm. on Intellectual
Prop., Competition, & the Internet).
7. See, e.g., Microsoft v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (holding that
patents are presumed valid and that a claim of invalidity must be proven under a clear and
convincing standard of proof); In re Seagate Technology, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(increasing the standard of proof necessary to establish willful infringement); eBay v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (requiring patentees to comply with the
equitable factor test to obtain a permanent patent injunction); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (2010) (holding that business methods are patentable); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (adjusting the obviousness standard). Since Congress had
failed to institute general patent reform, some scholars argued that the courts were the last
viable option to substantially re-tailor the patent laws in light of the advancing
technological changes in the economy, which arguably require a more flexible,
principles-based approach to patent doctrine. Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, in
particular, advanced the idea that the courts should employ judicial patent levers to make
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that remains vastly underappreciated and which operates largely hidden
beneath the surface. This largely unnoticed aspect of patent reform deals
with the administrative rules created by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO).
This article examines several administrative rules that the PTO
implemented to effectively manage a controversial category of patent
applications known as business methods. These rules, labeled
"administrative patent levers," 8 are defined as PTO rules that are
technology-specific and guided primarily by policy motivations and
institutional signals initiated by actors within all three branches of
government. This article also examines the legality of administrative
patent levers under established administrative law doctrine and proposes
a solution to the current flawed regime.
In particular, this article addresses how the PTO enacted a
complementary set of norms and rules to restrict business method
patents, which are viewed as a particularly suspect category of patents. 9
This article also maintains that the adoption of administrative patent
levers at the PTO corresponds with the judicial, legislative, and executive
branches' coordinated apprehension towards business method patents.
The PTO's use of administrative patent levers, for example, went hand in
hand with the Supreme Court's patent law clarifications achieved
through the use of complementary judicial patent levers.' 0  There
remained significant room, however, for the PTO to fill in any policy
vacuums that lingered via its administrative rulemaking function." In
the context of business methods, administrative patent levers were
patent law adjustments that reflect the plurality of participants and industry conditions.
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575
(2003).
8. This labeling borrows from Professor Dan Burk and Mark Lemley's analogous
conception of judicial patent levers. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 7 (describing how
courts can tailor patent law doctrine to reach suitable outcomes depending on the
industrial context). Like the judicial patent levers conceptualized by professors Burk and
Lemley, administrative patent levers are policy-oriented and technology-specific.
9. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 397.
10. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7.
11. See CORNELIUS M. KERW1N, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE
LAW AND MAKE POLICY 6 (1st ed. 1994) (discussing how administrative agencies engage
in rulemaking to fill policy or legal vacuums under the Administrative Procedure Act,
and that when the demands on these administrative institutions increase, the more likely
administrative rulemaking expands); cf Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 Nw. U.L. REV. 1495 (2001) (discussing that the PTO is rationally
ignorant of low quality patents because the cost of acquiring information to reach a high
quality patentability judgment exceeds the social benefit, given that most patents are
never legally asserted). Professor Lemley recommends that enacting general rules to
improve patent quality would be socially inefficient and that the courts present a better
forum for resolving patent quality issues. Id.
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developed to address some of the very real challenges associated with
these types of patents.' 2 As will be discussed below, however, the use of
administrative patent levers comes with some significant risks. The
levers, for example, may raise the cost and burden of compliance among
patent applicants in a way that does not comport with a principled legal
standard.
For example, one of Facebook Inc.'s patent applications relates to a
computer implemented method of selecting terms discussed by social
media users and associating those terms with topics, frequency ranks,
and users' demographic characteristics. 13  Although this application
arguably involves a business method, it was classified as a database
technology.' 4 Had the application been classified as a business method,
the administrative patent levers discussed below would have triggered a
substantially more rigorous and onerous level of review at the PTO. As
will be discussed, such an unprincipled application of administrative
patent levers may be challenged as arbitrary or capricious under
administrative law doctrine.
Although a great deal of attention has been devoted to why certain
policies and rule-making practices at the PTO are either desirable or
undesirable,' 5 little attention has been devoted to examine how these
rules and policies are instituted and legitimized. This discrepancy has
resulted in a scenario where PTO rulemaking all too often resembles a
"black box" to external observers. The process through which
administrative patent levers emerge has received scant consideration
among scholars and practitioners. The portrait provided in this article
challenges the widely held notion that the PTO primarily enacts rules
that mechanically execute the legal norms distilled from the Patent Act
and the binding judicial interpretations of that statute. Instead, this
article posits that the PTO has increased its role as a substantive
policymaker in the area of patent law through its creation of
administrative patent levers, and that it will likely continue down this
path in the foreseeable future.' 6 However, this path poses a significant
12. See discussion infra Part III (describing the unique challenges raised by business
method patents).
13. U.S. Patent Application No. 20100169327 (filed Dec. 31, 2008).
14. Id. The application was classified under technology Class 707, which pertains to
database technologies. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO CLASS
SCHEDULE, http://1.usa.gov/OzlUml (last visited July 20, 2012).
15. See Arti Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office's
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2051-81 (2009).
16. See Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 599 (2012) (stating
that the America Invents Act "continues the trend since 1999 of shifting control and
influence over patent law from the courts to the USPTO"); Clarissa Long, The PTO and
the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1965, 1966 (2009)
(describing how the PTO has maneuvered since the early 1990s to gain more influence
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challenge because the PTO, unlike most administrative agencies, lacks
substantive rule-making authority, and its foray into substantive
rulemaking will likely be reviewed by the federal courts.
The implementation of business method administrative patent levers
is explained through the lens of positive political theory. Positive
political theory examines the influence that political bodies and
institutions have on legal doctrine and legal outcomes. 17  From this
perspective, the political institutions that influenced the creation of
administrative patent levers at the PTO include governmental advocacy
manifested on the record in legislative bills, roundtable discussions,
hearings, and official policy statements. As proposed in this article, the
treatment extended to business methods across all branches of
government helps to explain why the PTO adopted extraordinary
business method patent norms and rule-making to a degree not seen
outside of other controversial patent areas such as software,
biotechnology, or green technology. 18  This behavior, although
descriptively accounted for by positive political theory, is not devoid of
potentially harmful, unintended consequences, as will be further
elaborated below.'
9
The article will proceed with Part II introducing the context, history,
and conceptual contours of business method patents. Part III will survey
the academic literature to expose the unique dangers imposed by these
patents on innovators and society. Part IV will examine how the judicial,
legislative, and executive branches all reacted to the vocal warnings of
these dangers. Part V will analyze the PTO's reaction to these
institutional and public policy reactions. This Part will also discuss five
administrative business method patent levers that the PTO developed in
response to the widespread institutional pressure, and the effect that these
and occupy a more central position in making patent law and policy). The America
Invents Act likewise calls for greater PTO policymaking since the law includes a section
enabling the PTO to provide priority examination for technologies that are important to
American competitiveness. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 26, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). See Dan
Cahoy, Inverse Enclosure: Abdicating the Green Technology Landscape 22 (2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). Determining what technologies are
important to American competitiveness will be within the PTO's policymaking
discretion.
17. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory
Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 43 (1994) ("[P]ositive political theory describes regulatory
policymaking as a part of a world in which political actors function within institutions
rationally and strategically to accomplish certain goals"). See generally DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
18. See David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers in the Software, Biotechnology
and Clean Technology Industries (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author).
19. See discussion infra Part VI.C (describing several risks involving the use of
administrative patent levers).
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measures have had on business method patenting. Finally, Part VI will
discuss the administrative law implications raised by the PTO's use of
the levers, their questionable legality and broader policy implications,
and a normative solution.
II. BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
Business methods provide a good opportunity to examine
administrative patent levers because they raise significant concerns
among a broad range of stakeholders. That is not to say that business
methods are the only technological area where the PTO has exercised
discretion in implementing administrative patent levers. The PTO has,
for example, implemented patent levers in other controversial and
challenging technology areas such as software, biotechnology, and green
technology.20 As will be discussed, however, business methods are a
subset of patents that have raised an inordinate measure of concern.
Before discussing the PTO's use of patent levers to deal with business
methods, this part will provide some background information regarding
business methods.
Business method patents, like patents in general, can be key
economic resources in today's knowledge-based economy. 21 Companies
use legal knowledge and resources to secure an advantage in and
property rights to a broad category of innovations, including what appear
to be fundamental business techniques.2 Take the case of the online
retailer Amazon.com, which patented its "one-click" shopping 
method 23
20. See Orozco, supra note 18, at 4-26.
21. One witness before a recent congressional hearing on patents testified:
[I]n 1984, the book value of the 150 largest U.S. companies ... was equal to 75
percent of their market value; that is, large U.S. companies were worth a little
more than their physical assets. In 2005, the book value of the 150 largest U.S.
Companies was equal to 36 percent of their book value. Two-thirds of the
value of large U.S. Corporations in this period are derived from intangible
assets and not from their physical assets. That's an idea-based economy.
How an Improved U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Can Create Jobs, Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet, 112th Cong. 1 (2011)
(statement of Robert J. Shapiro); see also Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the
Resource-Based Theory to Determine Covenant-not-to-Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J.
979 (2012) (describing how companies increasingly use non-compete contract terms to
obtain competitive advantage in a knowledge-based economy).
22. See David Orozco, Legal Knowledge as an Intellectual Property Management
Resource, 47 AM. Bus. L.J. 687, 718-21 (2010) (describing how firms attempt to
strategically shape the immediate legal environment through private legal strategies);
David Orozco, Rational Design Rights Ignorance, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 573-605 (2009)
(describing how some companies use legal knowledge to integrate intellectual property
rights to achieve design-based product differentiation).
23. Amazon's "one-click" patent claimed the idea that a browser-enabled command
to buy a certain item online will carry information about the purchaser's identity by
sending the server a "cookie," or code that the browser received previously from the
[Vol. 117:1
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and later sued competitor Barnes and Noble for patent infringement.24
Amazon used the patent on its e-commerce shopping method to obtain an
injunction and, eventually, a settlement from Barnes and Noble. In a
similar case, Netflix patented its entire business model of renting items to
shoppers online. Netflix eventually used the patent to sue competitor
Blockbuster when it offered a competing online movie rental service.
That case was also settled, with terms believed to be favorable to
Netflix. 26 In both cases, business method patents were at the heart of
fierce competitive battles between emergent online retailers and the
dominant brick-and-mortar incumbents.
27
The legal validity of some business method patent claims, however,
remains questionable because some of these claims extend to subject
matter that appears to be generally known, or is obvious in light of the
prior art.28  For example, in the Amazon case mentioned above,
Amazon's one-click patent was subsequently re-examined by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). After its re-examination, the PTO
rejected claims 1-5 and 11-26 of Amazon's patent as improperly
same server. See Why We Boycott Amazon, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND.,
http://bit.ly/auUuQx (last visited Aug. 4, 2012).
24. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D.
Wash. 1999), vacated, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
25. U.S. Patent No. 7,024,381 (filed May 14, 2003). Claim 1 of this patent reads:
A computer-implemented method for renting movies to customers, the method
comprising: providing electronic digital information that causes one or more
attributes of movies to be displayed; establishing, in electronic digital form,
from electronic digital information received over the Internet, a movie rental
queue associated with a customer comprising an ordered list indicating two or
more movies for renting to the customer; causing to be delivered to the
customer up to a specified number of movies based upon the order of the list; in
response to one or more delivery criteria being satisfied, selecting another
movie based upon the order of the list and causing the selected movie to be
delivered to the customer; and in response to other electronic digital
information received from the customer over the Internet, electronically
updating the movie rental queue.
26. Blockbuster, Netflix Settle Patent Dispute, REUTERS (June 27, 2007, 10:33 AM),
http://reut.rs/kC6914. Arguably, the business outcome was extremely favorable to
Netflix, as Blockbuster has since filed for bankruptcy. Id.
27. Other highly visible cases raised an alarm over the breadth of business methods.
The popular online auction site Priceline.com, for example, asserted its patent on reverse
online auctions. See Priceline.com v. Expedia, No. 99-CV-1991 (D. Conn. Oct. 13,
1999).
28. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 577 (1999); Wade M. Chumney, David L. Baumer & Roby B. Sawyers, Patents
Gone Wild: An Ethical Examination and Legal Analysis of Tax-Related and Tax Strategy
Patents, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 343 (2009); Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates
and Patent Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus.
L.J. 689, 689-739 (2006).
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granted.29  According to scholars, a significant portion of business
method patent claims are of suspect validity because the examiners at the
PTO lacked the experience necessary to properly evaluate many of the
claims granted in these patents.3 0 Likewise, a good deal of controversy
surrounds business method patents because they may be used to stifle
competition in rapidly evolving areas of business, such as e-commerce.
Commentators also point out that business method patents may wreak
havoc if they fall into the wrong hands.31 Several prominent cases are
highlighted where patent trolls, also referred to as non-practicing entities
(NPEs), aggressively wield business method patents. A NPE's sole
objective is to sue large companies and threaten a hold-up by obtaining
an injunction.
32
The trend toward stronger and broader patent rights amplified the
effects of business method patents. 33 This trend was propelled by the
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), a
special jurisdiction court that decides patent appeals.34 To clarify the
boundaries of patent rights, the CAFC promulgated formalistic patent
jurisprudence that emphasizes clearly defined tests and rules. To some
commentators, these tests led to a pro-patentee shift that presented
significant risks to firms because patent owners, and particularly patent
trolls, were empowered under the rules to hinder innovation via the legal
system by engaging in hold-ups and other extortionist tactics.
35
Another contentious issue concerning business method patents is
whether they can be conceptually identified as a unique category of
invention.36 From a statutory perspective, the U.S. Patent Act initially
failed to provide guidance other than suggesting that business methods
fell under the allowed general category of "processes," subject to
29. Jacqui Cheng, Amazon's 1-Click Patent Picked Apart by U.S. Patent Office, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 17, 2007, 1:14 PM), http://bit.ly/JEMagR.
30. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 28.
31. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 28, at 721.
32. Id.
33. See Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO
Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 199, 202-12 (2000) (discussing how the
CAFC's reversal of the PTO's denial of biotechnology and computer-related patents led
to a sharp rise in patent filings in these technology areas).
34. See Samuel Kortum & Josh Lemer, Stronger Protection or Technological
Revolution: What Is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?, 48 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER
CONFERENCE SERIES ON PUB. POL'Y 247(1998).
35. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Patent
Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1991 (2007).
36. John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent
Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 729, 765 (2006) ("All attempts by courts and Congress to arrive at a workable
definition for business methods have encountered intractable difficulties.").
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general, well established exceptions.37 In response to the perceived
dangers of business methods, The Patent Act was later amended to
provide a prior use defense related to methods of "doing or conducting
business." This amendment, however, failed to clearly define the term
method of "doing or conducting business."
38
In 2001, Congress introduced a bill, The Business Method Patent
Improvement Act, which would have raised the obviousness standard for
business methods.39 This bill actually defined business methods as
(1) a method of processing data; or performing calculation
operations; and which is uniquely designed for or utilized in the
practice, administration, or management of an enterprise;
(2) any technique used in athletics, instruction, or personal skills; and
(3) any computer-assisted implementation of a method described in
paragraph (1) or a technique described in paragraph (2)....
The bill was never enacted, however, so the definition lacks any
statutory authority.
The judiciary has referred to business methods without precisely
articulating the contours of this technology class. The earliest case cited
for the proposition that business methods remained beyond patentability
is Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co. 41 In that case, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that patent claims for a
bookkeeping system were unpatentable per se. A series of subsequent
cases reinforced the presumption that a "business method exception"
excluded business methods from being patentable.42 The advent of
information and communications technology, however, challenged the
per se rule against patents covering data processing.43 In 1981, the U.S.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). The well-established exceptions to patentability
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court are laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
38. Allison & Hunter, supra note 36, at 766.
39. H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. (2001).
40. Id. § 2(f).
41. Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co, 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908); Thomas
R. Makin, Hotel Checking: You Can Check Out Any Time You Want, But Can You Ever
Leave? The Patenting of Business Methods, 24 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 93, 94 (2000);
Russell A. Kom, Is Legislation the Answer: An Analysis of the Proposed Legislation for
Business Method Patents, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2002).
42. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding that mathematical
algorithms are not patentable).
43. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). In this case, the Supreme Court
rejected a patent on a computerized method for converting decimal numbers to binary
2012]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court relaxed its rule against software patents in Diamond v.
Diehr.4 In that case, the Court held that a software algorithm might be
patentable as a process if it claims a "useful, concrete and tangible
result. 45
The legal status of business methods, as opposed to software
algorithms, was later settled when the CAFC decided the State Street
case.46 In that case, the CAFC dismissed the business method exception
altogether, holding that a software algorithm for processing data in a
system was patentable. Following the Supreme Court's reasoning, the
CAFC found the algorithm created a "useful, concrete and tangible
result" that may be patentable even if the result is something as non-
physical as an investment value.47 Ultimately, the CAFC mentioned that
the business method exception was incompatible with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Patent Act, and that any rejections of
business methods in the past had been based on statutory issues such as
novelty, not on a per se categorization and exclusion of business
methods.48
State Street raises the issue of whether the definition of a business
method patent can ever be grounded in principle.49 Some commentators
argue that business methods precede the modem understanding of these
processes because inventors have patented methods that have pertained
to business processes as far back as 1889.50 Other commentators point
out that the claims need not even be drafted as methods and that, despite
any regulation, patent drafters routinely construct claims that reflect
business methods as elements of a machine or system.5'
numbers because the patent applied an abstract scientific or mathematical principle. Id.
at 73.
44. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
45. Id. (holding, however, that purely abstract ideas remain beyond patentability);
see also Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1061
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that a mathematical process for detecting and analyzing
electrocardiographic signals are patentable).
46. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
47. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1375.
48. Id.
49. See John R. Allison & Emerson Tiller, The Business Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 987 (2003).
50. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, WHITE PAPER ON AUTOMATED FINANCIAL
OR MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) (White Paper Ver.
1.43) [hereinafter PTO WHITE PAPER] ("On January 8, 1889, the era of automated
financial/management business data processing method patents was born. United States
patents 395,781; 395,782; and 395,783 were granted to inventor-entrepreneur Herman
Hollerith on that date."), available at http://bit.ly/Mpn5ZC.
51. Merges, supra note 28.
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Recently, the Supreme Court addressed the question of what test
should determine the patentability of business methods. In that case,
the Court rejected the CAFC's exclusive use of the "machine or
transformation test" to determine business method patentability and, in
the process, the Court commented on the broader question of whether
business methods are even patentable. 53 The Court stated:
Section 101 similarly precludes the broad contention that the term
"process" categorically excludes business methods. The term
"method," which is within §100(b)'s definition of "process," at least
as a textual matter and before consulting other limitations in the
Patent Act and this Court's precedents, may include at least some
methods of doing business.
54
However, the Bilski Court, like other courts, did not define business
method patents. The case has been criticized for failing provide a clear
standard to determine business method patentability. According to some
scholars, the Bilski decision leaves a considerable leeway for lower
courts to apply discretion.55 This leeway similarly applies to the PTO
and increases the role for administrative patent levers as substantive
policy instruments in this technology area.
The PTO offers a working definition of business methods. The
PTO identifies business method patents primarily, though not
exclusively, through technology Class 705: "Data Processing, Financial,
Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price Determination."
According to the PTO, Class 705
is the generic class for apparatus and corresponding methods for
performing data processing operations, in which there is a significant
change in the data or for performing calculation operations wherein
the apparatus or method is uniquely designed for or utilized in the
practice, administration, or management of an enterprise, or in the
processing of financial data.
56
52. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Susan J. Marsnik & Robert E. Thomas, Drawing a Line in the Patent Subject-
Matter Sands: Does Europe Provide a Solution to the Software and Business Method
Patent Problem?, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 227, 264 (2011). The CAFC recently
provided guidance regarding software patentability in light of the Bilski decision. See
Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (upholding the
validity of software method claims and ruling that the claims were not abstract in light of
the Bilski decision).
56. Class Definition, Class 705, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://l.usa.gov/QmhWmj (last visited Aug. 4, 2012). The PTO definition of business
methods matches a business method definition offered by Professor Daniel Spulber.
Business method patents are defined by Professor Spulber as "the discovery of a
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Given the likely insurmountable lack of definitional precision, it is
unsurprising that business method patents have been asserted in a variety
of cases involving financial products, 57 insurance products,58  tax
methods,59 and e-commerce. It is not coincidental, however, that
business method patents became a salient issue as online business
transactions proliferated. The rapid emergence of online business
transactions amplified the market power of business method patent
owners who increasingly and aggressively asserted methods related to
electronic means of conducting business. The State Street decision
opened "the floodgates" to business method patenting and litigation.6'
One source reports that, in the year before the State Street case was
decided, the PTO received 1,300 business method applications. 62 Infollowing year, the PTO received 7,800 business method applications. 63
III. THE SOCIAL COST OF BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
Administrative patent levers are implemented to deal with the
negative effects of certain technologies. As certain technologies become
increasingly cumulative64 and distributed,65 patents raise considerable
transaction costs if they are used to block technological progress or
66implementation. As recognized in the literature, there are several
commercial technique for firms to address market opportunities, such as a transaction
procedure, market microstructure, financial system, operational process, or organizational
form." Daniel F. Spulber, Should Business Method Inventions be Patentable?, 3 J. OF
LEGAL ANALYSIS 265, 270 (2011).
57. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,088,685 (filed Aug. 27, 1998).
58. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,089,201 (filed Sept. 24, 1999).
59. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999).
60. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997).
61. Korn, supra note 41, at 1370; Rai, supra note 33, at 211; Allison & Hunter,
supra note 36, at 730-31.
62. Korn, supra note 41, at 1370-71.
63. Id.
64. Cumulative industries include information and technology communications,
semiconductors, biotechnology, and software. Proponents of open software are
particularly critical of Intemet-related business methods because these patents may block
open access to software and technology. See Lawrence Lessig, Patent Problems, THE
INDUSTRY STANDARD (Jan. 21, 2000, 12:00 AM), http://bit.ly/MkyHae.
65. HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN BUSINESS MODELS xiii (2006) (discussing how open
innovation "means that companies should make greater use of external ideas and
technologies in their own business, while letting their unused ideas be used by other
companies").
66. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 9 (2008) (arguing that
vague patent claims in the high tech sector raise costs for the majority of firms); Michael
A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998). Patents of poor quality also raise
transaction costs overall, as parties wastefully litigate and duplicate the PTO's efforts to
determine patent validity. See John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker:
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tactics employed by patent owners that disadvantage competitors and
impose social costs in the process. 67 For example, a company can patent
a rival substituting technology to prevent others from practicing the
invention.6 8 Thus, a superior and socially beneficial alternate technology
might never be applied due to these blocking patents. 69 A patentee may
also engage in "evergreening," or patenting an incremental aspect of a
preexisting technology to unduly extend the monopoly lifetime of the
underlying technology. 70 Another tactic patentees employ is to engage in
strategic filing practices such as abusing the continuation procedure.
7
1
Lastly, patent owners may forum shop by filing patent lawsuits in any of
the pro-plaintiff "rocket docket" jurisdictions. 72  Two additional
strategies are particularly relevant to business method patents and impose
social costs when undertaken. These two strategies, which may have
prompted the use of administrative patent levers, include patenting
overly broad claims and using a patent to extract an unfair settlement.
A. Patenting Overly Broad Claims
Business method patents are often criticized for being unduly broad.
There are a few things to consider regarding this criticism. First, a patent
is unduly broad if it improperly claims technology that was disclosed,
practiced in the prior art, or was obvious to one with ordinary skill in the
art.73 Business methods are often criticized as unduly appropriating
technology that had been previously practiced or as lacking innovative
merit. This criticism has some support because some business method-
related prior art remained hidden from PTO examiners.74
Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727,
731 (2002).
67. These tactics, employed by patent owners, go beyond the traditional tactic of
asserting a patent to gain exclusivity.
68. Richard J. Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the
Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514, 524-25 (1982).
69. Id.
70. See Christine S. Paine, Brand Name Drug Manufacturers Risk Antitrust
Violations By Slowing Generic Production Through Patent Layering, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 479, 497-506 (2003).
71. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 71-83 (2004) (discussing the problems created by the
continuation practice).
72. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (describing the various instances involving prior art
that negate novelty in a patent application); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006 & Supp. 2011)
(stating that a patent may not be obtained if "the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains").
74. Allison & Tiller, supra note 49.
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For example, in the case of American Stock Exchange, LLC v.
Mopex, Inc. 75 a non-practicing entity sued the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) for infringing a business method patent related to a financial
product known as an exchange-traded fund (ETF).76 The PTO granted
Mopex a patent to this financial method on July 11, 2000.7 7 The AMEX
sued to invalidate the patent on the ground that the financial method had
been practiced and disclosed in prior art that PTO examiners failed to
review. At trial, the AMEX submitted evidence that this type of ETF
had been developed, traded, and disclosed by the investment bank
Morgan Stanley.78 The court considered evidence that, in 1994, Morgan
Stanley had submitted a publicly available application for an ETF with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. This prior art was then used
to invalidate Mopex's business method patent.79
A separate but common attack on these patents is that patent
examiners handling these applications did not have sufficient training in
the emergent fields of Internet commerce, a field with increasingly
claimed business methods. A closely related argument is that examiners
did not have sufficiently updated non-patent literature databases with
industry-relevant prior art that would enable the examiner to narrow or
reject unduly broad business method patent claims. 80 Patent examiners
are also notoriously pressed for time due to their increasing workload.81
75. American Stock Exch., LLC v. Mopex, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
76. Id. at 325.
77. Open End Mut. Fund Securitization Process, U.S. Patent No. 6,088,685 (filed
Aug. 27, 1998).
78. American Stock Exch., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
79. Id. at 333.
80. Allison & Tiller, supra note 49. Sources of non-patent literature include items
such as trade press articles, conference materials, technical papers, and doctoral theses.
81. The PTO has described its workload crisis in the following manner:
Today, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is under siege.
Patent application filings have increased dramatically throughout the world.
There are an estimated seven million pending applications in the world's
examination pipeline, and the annual workload growth rate in the previous
decade was in the range of 20-30 percent. Technology has become
increasingly complex, and demands from customers for higher quality products
and services have escalated. Our applicants are concerned that the PTO does
not have access to all of the fees they pay to have their patent and trademark
applications examined, thereby jeopardizing the benefits intellectual property
rights bring to our national economy. In the United States, these demands have
created a workload crisis.
PTO, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN (Feb. 3, 2003), available at
http://l.usa.gov/OI3sbi; cf Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95
Nw. U. L. REv. 1495 (2001) (arguing that devoting resources to strengthen the patent
examination process at the PTO would be socially inefficient).
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Accordingly, it is argued that many overly broad business method patent
claims have been issued.
B. Using Business Method Patents to Extract Unfair Settlements
The social costs of overly broad business method patents are
amplified when they fall into the hands of the so-called patent trolls, or
non-practicing entities (NPEs).82 A NPE is a party who owns a patent,
does not practice the underlying technology, and uses the patent to sue
large companies to obtain a settlement or a verdict.8 3 According to one
source, there were more than 2,600 instances in 2010 where a company
was the litigation target of a NPE, which represents a 48 percent increase
above the average amount of the prior three years.8 4 Other evidence
supports this finding. According to the registration statement recently
filed with the SEC by a company involved in assembling defensive
patent portfolios to protect companies from NPE's, "[T]here were over
550 patent infringement cases filed by NPEs in 2010 against more than
3,000 defendants, which comprised over 2,000 unique companies, some
of which were sued more than once." 85
The NPE exploits the fact that it is a small company with no real
presence in the market and cannot be counter sued for infringing any of
the larger defendant's patents.86 Often, when one large company sues
another large company (usually a competitor) for patent infringement,
the competitor countersues and likewise alleges patent infringement.
The result is usually a negotiated cross-license and technology sharing
agreement.87 A large company does not have this option when it is the
target of a patent lawsuit initiated by a NPE.
82. In 2001, Peter Detkin (then assistant general counsel at Intel Corp.) is said to
have coined the term "patent troll" to describe firms that acquire patents to extract
settlements from companies on dubious infringement claims. See Peter N. Detkin,
Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 636 (2007)
(stating that he coined the term).
83. Some commentators suggest that NPEs extract settlements by strategically filing
cases against many defendants, and by employing a contingency fee strategy, where the
law firm representing the NPE assumes the significant upfront costs of litigation. See
Stijepko Tokic, The Role of Consumers in Deterring Settlement Agreements Based on
Invalid Patents: The Case of Non-Practicing Entities, 2012 STAN. TECH, L. REV. 2 (2012).
84. Litigations Over Time, PATENTFREEDOM.CoM, http://bit.ly/N1Z8Vm (last visited
Aug. 4, 2012).
85. RPX Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-l), at 2 (Jan. 21, 2011), available at
http://l.usa.gov/QBVTIA.
86. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
87. See Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital:
Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV.
8,8(1997).
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Compounding the problem is that the NPE will often enforce a
business method patent against a large company operating in a complex,
or cumulative, technology area.88 This action places pressure on the
defendant because it may be forced to expend considerable resources to
design around the patent or may face a complete shutdown if the NPE
obtains an injunction. 89 This action also creates the risk that the NPE
will engage in a strategic hold-up90 and extort an unreasonably large
settlement or verdict.9' For example, the NPE Eolas acquired $521
million when it obtained a patent injunction against Microsoft.92 NTP,
Inc., another NPE, notoriously obtained $612.5 million when it
threatened to enforce a permanent patent injunction against Research-In-
Motion, makers of the "Blackberry" handheld device.93
Business method patents and their harmful consequences have been
uniformly criticized. 94  However, in one empirical study, Professors
Allison and Tiller counter the assertion that business method patents are
below average quality.95  In their study, Allison and Tiller assess
business method patents using well established quality measures and find
that no basis exists for claiming that these patents are inferior in terms of
the number of prior art references, claims, and inventors.96 Professors
Allison and Tiller attribute the high levels of public discord regarding
business method patents to an information "bandwagon" effect whereby
business methods were judged based on the negative comments of
experts, with negative views reinforced by a confirmation bias based on
public discussions of egregious examples such as Amazon's "one-click"
patent.97 Allison and Tiller's assessment is supported by the way the
88. See Orozco & Conley, supra note 6.
89. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 35.
90. Id.
91. See Tokic, supra note 83, at 10 (stating that, prior to 1990, there had been only
one patent damage award larger than $100 million and that, in the last several years, there
have been at least 15 judgments and settlements in that category with at least five
exceeding $500 million).
92. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
93. This settlement occurred even though the PTO was going to invalidate many of
NTP's patent claims. As illustrated by these two cases, it is important to highlight that
NPEs may assert patent claims that fall outside the traditional business method patent
realm.
94. See Simson L. Garfinkel, Patently Absurd, WIRED, July 1994,
http://bit.ly/Mc6XJA; James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000,
http://nyti.ms/QC8HP4; Robert M. Hunt, You Can Patent That?: Are Patents on
Computer Programs and Business Methods Good for the New Economy?, 2001 Bus.
REV. Q1 5, 5-15, available at http://l.usa.gov/MpCCJ1.





media generally portrays business method patents in a negative light.98
A subsequent empirical study conducted by Professor Starling Hunter
likewise concluded that business methods did not fall below an average
quality metric.99
IV. INSTITUTIONAL REACTIONS TO BUSINESS METHODS ACROSS THE
THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
Several egregious cases involving NPEs aggressively wielding
broad business method patents against well-known companies triggered a
wave of public scrutiny. 100 Public policymakers responded as vocal and
influential patent law stakeholders voiced the alarm. Policymakers
operate through public institutions, which provide a forum for
assembling information and bringing stakeholders together. In the patent
field, there is a diverse, active, and vocal group of stakeholders
continually vying to shape patent law and policy. 10  A recent study
conducted by the author found that 191 separate for-profit corporations
filed amicus briefs in 16 recent Supreme Court patent cases.1°2 A
subsequent study by Professor Colleen Chien found that, in the past 20
years of patent amicus brief advocacy, more than 1,500 amici,
representing thousands of organizations, companies, and individuals,
have signed onto briefs in hundreds of patent law cases.
10 3
Policymakers' institutional reactions to interest groups are evident
in all three branches of government, which respond to varying degrees to
interest group advocacy. 104 From a positive political theory perspective,
policymakers often do not initiate regulatory oversight unless interest
groups first voice the alarm. 10 5 The alarm and call for regulatory reform
98. See sources cited supra note 94.
99. Starling D. Hunter III, Have Business Method Patents Gotten a Bum Rap? Some
Empirical Evidence, 6 J. INFO. TECH THEORY & APPLICATION 1, 4 (2004).
100. Id.
101. Orozco & Conley, supra note 6, at 109.
102. Id.
103. Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts' Friends Can Teach
Us about the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395 (2011).
104. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 310-11 (2007).
105. The "fire alarm" model of regulatory change was first described by Mathew D.
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz in Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols
Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165-79 (1984). The "fire alarm" model has
been widely discussed in political science and legal scholarship examining regulatory and
administrative behavior from a positive political theory perspective. See Mathew D.
McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 434-35 (1989)
(mentioning various congressional oversight techniques); Sidney A. Shapiro, Political
Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMrN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994)
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is then delegated to administrative agencies, such as the PTO, under what
has been called the "fire-alarm model" of regulatory oversight.10 6 If
policymakers respond to interest group pressure, it is expected that
administrative agencies will then respond to policymakers' concerns
under the principal-agent theory of administrative decision-making.
10 7
From this perspective, elected policymakers exercise considerable
discretion over administrative rulemaking and policy given their ability
to enact legislation, approve staffing, and engage in general oversight
and control of an agency's funding through appropriations. 1°  As with
various other agencies, Congress is generally the ultimate decision-
maker with respect to the PTO's budgets and appointments. Congress
also "conducts oversight and investigations, and engages in casework on
behalf of constituents."'109  Scholars recognize that congressional
hearings are effective instruments for achieving social goals and
extracting concessions from industry.10
As will be discussed next, the judicial, legislative, and executive
branches all coordinated a spirited public debate concerning business
method patents. This heightened interest in business methods was
manifested through judicial patent levers, hearings, proposed legislation,
roundtable discussions, and public policy papers. The argument
advanced here is that these different institutional mechanisms signaled a
clear and unified expression of how seriously this diverse group of
policymakers considered the alarm raised by constituents with respect to
business methods.
(two chief ways Congress might supervise agencies: "police patrol" and "fire alarm"
oversight).
106. McCubbins and Schwartz, supra note 105.
107. Kerwin, supra note 11, at 220-21.
108. When the business method administrative patent levers were implemented, the
PTO lacked fee-setting authority, which, according to Professor Arti Rai, is an important
power for an agency with operations that are entirely fee-based. See Rai, supra note 15,
at 2056. Under current law, the PTO may keep its fees; however, Congressional
appropriators must make this decision annually; see also 35 U.S.C. § 42(e) (2006).
Recently, Section 10 of The America Invents Act granted the PTO fee setting authority.
109. Kerwin, supra note 11, at 29.
110. See, e.g., Nathaniel Grow, In Defense of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 49 AM.
Bus. L.J. 211 (2012) (discussing how Congress has used the threat of removing major
leagues baseball's antitrust exemption during congressional hearings to extract pro-
competitive results in that industry); JAMES EDWARD MILLER, THE BASEBALL BUSINESS:
PURSUING PENNANTS AND PROFITS IN BALTIMORE 6 (1990) (stating that Congressional
hearings were held in the 1950s and 1960s to pressure "baseball to expand, to improve
the situation of the minor league, or to [provide] increased television or radio coverage").
Another scholar examines the role of Congressional hearings to conduct oversight of
foreign affairs in the executive branch as an example of positive political theory. See




A. Reactions from the Judiciary
In several instances, the Judiciary echoed the alarm concerning the
harmful effects of business methods. This alarm, in turn, influenced the
PTO's administrative decision-making since the agency's rules are
guided by the Supreme Court's statutory interpretations of the Patent
Act. In particular, two recent Supreme Court cases shed light on how the
Court reacted to business methods.
In eBay v. MercExchange, the NPE MercExchange sought to obtain
a permanent injunction against eBay after successfully asserting a
business method patent against the online retailer.1"' The legal doctrine
at issue in that case applied to patents in general because the decision
refrained the test for awarding a permanent injunction in patent cases as
one involving the traditional factor test for equitable relief.1"2 Justice
Kennedy, however, wrote a concurring opinion with three other justices
that singled out business methods as deserving additional scrutiny under
the factor test. Justice Kennedy wrote:
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis
for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining
licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially
serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to
buy licenses to practice the patent. When the patented invention is
but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce
and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage
in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate
for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public
interest. In addition injunctive relief may have different
consequences for the burgeoning number of patents over business
methods, which were not of much economic and legal significance in
earlier times. The potential vagueness and suspect validity of some
of these patents may affect the calculus under the four-factor test.' 
13
111. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
112. Id. at 391 ("According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant
such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction."); see also David Orozco & James G.
Conley, The "Longer Walk" After eBay v. MercExchange, 42 LES NOUVELLES 426, 429
(2007) (discussing the eBay v. MercExchange decision and its impact on licensors).
113. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). Positive political science theorists argue that the Judiciary makes
determinations that are less likely to be overturned by the Legislature or unenforced by
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In the more recent Bilski v. Kappos case, the Court held that
business methods are patentable subject matter.1 4 Justice Kennedy, once
again speaking for the Court, reiterated the particular dangers raised by
business methods:
At the same time, some business method patents raise special
problems in terms of vagueness and suspect validity. The
Information Age empowers people with new capacities to perform
statistical analyses and mathematical calculations with a speed and
sophistication that enable the design of protocols for more efficient
performance of a vast number of business tasks. If a high enough bar
is not set when considering patent applications of this sort, patent
examiners and courts could be flooded with claims that would put a
chill on creative endeavor and dynamic change. 115
In Bilski, the Supreme Court rejected the CAFC's exclusive
application of the machine-or-transformation test for business
methods. 16 The CAFC may have decided to raise the bar on business
methods and depart from State Street in the Bilski case due to the
significant criticism targeting business methods. As suggested by
scholars, the social importance of an issue before appellate courts is
measured by the amicus briefs filed in response to the case." 7 Amicus
briefs are seldom filed in appellate court cases. In the Bilski case,
however, 39 briefs were filed before the CAFC, indicating that the case
and the overall issue of business method patentability raised an
extraordinary alarm among parties interested in patent law." 
8
B. Reactions from the Legislature
The business method warning perhaps rang loudest during the early
years of the Internet when Amazon.com threatened to assert its "one-
the Executive. Although it cannot be stated with certainty, it is plausible that the
Supreme Court's treatment of business methods follows this paradigm. See McNollgast,
Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 105, 124 (2006);
McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule
of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1633 (1995).
114. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010).
115. Id. at 3218 (internal citations omitted).
116. Id. at 3227. The CAFC's machine-or-transformation test was developed to
determine whether a business method was tied to a machine or transformed data in a
technical manner. Under this test, if the business method failed to meet the machine-or-
transformation criteria, the business method would be deemed abstract and not
patentable.
117. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1109, 1109-22 (1988); Orozco
& Conley, supra note 6.
118. The author counted the amicus briefs using Lexis-Nexis.
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click" e-commerce method patent against online competitors." 9 When
this occurred, companies quickly realized the danger of business methods
and began to sound the alarm to elected representatives.12  In 2009, the
Chief Executive Officer of Micron Technology warned legislators of the
dangers related to NPEs asserting business methods during a legislative
hearing on patent reform. The corporate executive stated:
It is increasingly routine to read of a single lawsuit in which an
NPE/plaintiff has sued a dozen or more companies. For example, a
plaintiff recently sued twenty separate financial institutions in a
single action, claiming that its patent on a point of sale debiting
system was infringed by the institutions' various payment services.
Another case named 22 companies as defendants, asserting that each
was infringing the plaintiffs broadly-worded patents relating to
security scanning. Another NPE just filed a lawsuit accusing forty
companies of violating two patents relating to computer-assisted
sales. 121
The House of Representatives and the Senate routinely hold patent
hearings related to patent law and administration. Since 1995, the House
has held 38 separate patent-related hearings. 22 The Senate, in turn, has
119. For example, in response to Amazon asserting its one-click business method
patent, the Free Software Foundation (FSF) advocated a complete boycott of Amazon's
services. See Boycott Amazon!, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., available at:
http://bit.ly/auUuQx (last visited Aug. 14, 2012); see also Korn, supra note 41, at 1372.
120. Legislators hold hearings to demonstrate responsiveness to constituents'
demands. Hearings also send a signal to institutional actors in the other branches of
government. As a federal matter, issues related to patents are initially heard in the House
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet and in the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.
121. Patent Reform in the I I Ith Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. (2009) (statement of Steven
Appleton, Chairman and CEO, Micron Tech., Inc.); see also Patent Quality
Improvement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual
Prop., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of David M. Simon, Chief Patent Counsel for Intel
Corp.) ("Several problems contribute to making this 'patent troll' business model a
simple and effective source of illegitimate profit irrespective of the quality of the patent.
For example, if the troll can claim that the patent covers $5 billion in annual revenue, that
troll will ask for a royalty fee of a few percentage points of revenue; e.g., $150 million
per year. While that may seem to be an absurd amount to pay to someone who bought a
patent out of bankruptcy for less than one hundred thousand dollars, the troll will threaten
the legitimate business with a permanent injunction at the end of the patent case,
threatening the halt of the sale of a critical product or closing down a production facility.
Even if the chance of the troll winning is low, the troll's costs are modest, normally a few
million dollars at most. In contrast, the legitimate business the troll targeted faces
potential financial ruin if it can no longer sell a key product. Intel recently faced such a
troll who wanted $8 billion and a permanent injunction after purchasing the patent for
$50,000.").
122. This statistic is based on the author's own research involving the various hearing
transcripts.
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held eight separate patent-related hearings since that date. 123  These
hearings, at times, deal with topics specific to certain industries, such as
biotechnology, general oversight on PTO appropriations and
administration, and legislative proposals for patent reform.
The first recorded discussion of business method patents in the
Legislature occurred on March 25, 1999, when the House held an
oversight hearing on patent reform. 24 Since then, transcripts reflect a
mention of business methods 20 times in House hearings and twice in
Senate hearings. These statistics represent a mention of business
methods in 53 percent of the House hearings and 25 percent of Senate
hearings related to patents. This level of attention devoted to one
particular technology area is extraordinary. Oftentimes, during these
hearings, the issue of business methods was raised as a factor related to
the decline of patent quality indicators due to the difficulties patent
examiners face when searching business method-related prior art.'25 As
stated in one hearing:
The quality of a patent is synonymous with the value of that patent,
and patent quality is dependent on the extent to which an invention
has been certified to be useful, novel and nonobvious when compared
to the existing state of the art. A poor quality patent, on the other
hand, is typically invalid and may have far-reaching and negative
ramifications for the individuals involved, as well as for the economy
at large.
126
One measure used to assess the elusive concept of patent quality is
the rate at which patent applications are re-examined or declared invalid
in court. 27 Scant evidence, however, was introduced in the legislative
hearings, and empirical data specifically related to business methods was
lacking. 28  In 2001, a patent hearing in the House was devoted
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of John
Thomas) [hereinafter Patent Quality Hearing] ("Persistent accounts suggest that patent
quality remains at less than optimal levels.").
126. Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, & Intellectual Prop., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman).
127. See PTO WHITE PAPER, supra note 50; Allison & Hunter, supra note 36, at 732-
36 (discussing that patent quality is an inherently elusive concept and that problems with
patent quality exist in all fields of technology).
128. See, e.g., Patent Quality Hearing, supra note 125. In this hearing, dealing
specifically with patent quality, the statements about patent quality were conclusory in
nature, and no empirical evidence aside from anecdotal accounts was introduced to
indicate that business methods were below average quality. Id. These statements support
Allison & Tiller's position, supra note 49, regarding a behavioral bias against business
methods. In addition, the National Academy of Sciences stated:
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specifically to the issue of business methods. 129 During this hearing, the
PTO's Business Method Patent Initiative was discussed, with various
witnesses providing their thoughts on the efficacy of the initiative.
130
Other topics discussed included the policy implications of treating
business methods as a separate patent category, and the support for and
against business method-specific legislation.
131
Hand in hand with the various hearings, which send signals to
patent law stakeholders, the Legislature introduced bills as a response to
the alarms. The first instance of legislation targeting business methods
was The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (the "Protection
Act"). 132 This legislation modified the Patent Act to provide a first user
defense against business methods. The Protection Act provides a
defense to a charge of infringement of a patent on a "method of doing or
conducting business" if the accused infringer, in good faith, reduced the
method to practice at least one year before the patent was filed, and
commercialized the method in the United States any time before the
patent filing date. 133 The Protection Act was passed in response to the
alarm raised by what was perceived as the low quality of business
method patents.' 
34
[T]he claim that quality has deteriorated in a broad and systematic way has not
been empirically tested. Three seemingly direct measures of quality are (1) the
ratio of invalid to valid patent determinations in infringement lawsuits, (2) the
error rate in PTO quality assurance reviews of allowed patent applications, and
(3) the rate of claim cancellation or amendment or outright patent revocation in
re-examination proceedings in the PTO. These indicators show mixed results.
STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., NAT'L ACAD. OF SCiS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 48 (2004) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]; see also Jeffrey R. Kuester & Lawrence
E. Thompson, Risks Associated with Restricting Business Method and E-Commerce
Patents, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 657, 679 (2001) (discussing that no economic analysis has
been provided by business method patent critics to justify their position that, on the
whole, these patents are costly to society).
129. Business Method Patents: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm.. on Courts, the
Internet, & Intellectual Prop., 107th Cong. (2001).
130. The PTO's Business Method Patent Initiative is discussed further below in
relation to the administrative patent levers. See infra Part V.
131. The various legislative hearings discussing patent issues and business methods
are on file with the author.
132. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4001,
4502(a), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-561.
133. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000).
134. See, e.g., Patent Reform and the Patent and Trademark Office Reauthorization
for Fiscal Year 2000: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, &
Intellectual Prop., 106th Cong. 229 (1999) (statement by The National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM)). For example, NAM stated:
A prior user defense will be even more useful in new subject areas such as
biotechnology, software, and business methods than in more traditional
subjects such as chemistry. Applications in young fields strain the expertise
and resources of the PTO, inasmuch as much more of the pertinent prior art is
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Proposals to target business methods were included in another bill
called The Business Methods Improvement Act of 2001 (the
"Improvement Act").1 35 The Improvement Act, though never passed,
was introduced to address concerns in the Legislature that patents for
abstract ideas and weak patents were hindering innovation.'36 The
Improvement Act would have changed the obviousness standards related
to business methods and would require the following:
A business method invention shall be presumed obvious under this
section if the only significant difference between the combined
teachings of the prior art and the claimed invention is that the claimed
invention is appropriate for use with a computer technology,
unless... (A) the application of the computer technology is novel; or
(B) the computer technology is novel and not the subject of another
patent or patent application.... 137
The intended effect of this language would be to prevent applicants
from receiving business method patents for innovations that were novel
simply because they were implemented with the aid of a computer.
Another provision in the Improvement Act would have created an
opportunity for the public to submit evidence of prior art while the patent
application was under review and to provide for an opposition procedure
under a lower standard of proof.
In 2011, Congress enacted significant patent reform with the
passage of The America Invents Act (the "Invents Act"). 38 The Invents
Act exempts from patentability any tax strategy patents, which are a
subset of business methods.139 In addition, Section 18 of the Invents Act
allows a defendant to a patent suit involving financial business methods
found outside of previous, readily searched patents. Accordingly, it is simply
easier for a search to miss relevant prior art, with the result of a questionable
patent being issued .... The sharp rise in business method applications since
the State Street Bank decision demonstrates that some parties had shied away
from the expense of seeking a patent owing to the uncertainty that the subject
matter would even be found acceptable. Such parties should not be penalized
now, with loss of the right to practice their own technology, for a valid business
judgment then.
Id.
135. H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. (2001).
136. See Kom, supra note 41, at 1376.
137. H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. § 4(d)(l)(A)-(B) (2001).
138. S. 23, 112th Cong. § 14 (2011) ("For purposes of evaluating an invention under
section 102 or 103 of title 35, United States Code, any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or
deferring tax liability, whether known or unknown at the time of the invention or
application for patent, shall be deemed insufficient to differentiate a claimed invention
from the prior art."); see also Chumney, Baumer & Sawyers, supra note 28.
139. See Chumney, Baumer & Sawyers, supra note 28.
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to challenge the validity of the patent at the PTO. 140 This type of post-
issuance patent challenge is singular since it would apply retroactively to
all previously issued business method patents, in addition to those that
might be issued in the future. This provision would also lack the existing
time limitations usually reserved for post-issuance oppositions. Section
18 has been criticized as an appeasement to the financial services
industry since it applies only to financial business methods. Section 18
states:
For purposes of this section, the term 'covered business method
patent' means a patent that claims a method or corresponding
apparatus for performing data processing operations utilized in the
practice, administration, or management of a financial product or
service, except that the term shall not include patents for
technological inventions.
14 1
C. Reactions from the Executive Branch
Several agencies within the Executive branch of government raised
the alarm concerning business methods. The most obvious executive
agency to look to for alarm signals is the PTO itself. In March 2000, in
response to the alarm over business methods, the PTO launched a
Business Method Patent Initiative that included industry outreach and
quality programs. 142  The industry outreach included a series of
roundtable meetings with stakeholders on issues related to business
methods. At the first roundtable, a topic for consideration was whether
computer-implemented business method patents encouraged or curbed
growth in innovation. 143 Since March 2000, the PTO has held yearly
business method patent roundtables to discuss topics related to business
methods.
140. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(G)).
141. H.R. 1249,112thCong.§18(2011).
142. Notice of Roundtable on Computer-Implemented Business Method Patent
Issues, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,811, 38,811-13 (June 22, 2000) ("The industry outreach programs
are intended to encompass the establishment of a customer partnership with industry, the
convening of a roundtable forum, and an effort to obtain industry feedback on prior art
issues. The quality programs encompass steps to enhance the technical training of
examiners, revise the examination guidelines and examples, and expand current prior art
search activities. This includes a review of mandatory search areas, the establishment of
a new second-level review of all allowed applications in Class 705, and an expansion of
the sampling size for quality review along with the introduction of a new in-process
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The U.S. Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago and Atlanta have also
conducted roundtables on business methods. 144 For example, in April
2003, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta invited academics and
practitioners to discuss the effects of business method patents on the
financial services industry. The conference announcement posed the
following questions for consideration:
What are the implications of these developments for the evolution
and structure of the financial services industry? How will they affect
business strategy? Will the granting of business methods patents
stifle product and service innovation or will it promote a vibrant
industry? How has the U.S. Patent Office approached the questions
of whether certain business methods are or are not eligible for patent
protection?
145
In addition to hearings and roundtables, several departments within
the Executive branch issued policy papers that highlighted the dangers of
business methods. For example, in July 2009, the PTO prepared a
Business Methods White Paper (the "PTO White Paper") that mentions
some of the unique challenges related to examining business methods.
The PTO White Paper states:
Patent examining in Class 705 is filled with challenges. This class
contains diverse business topics (e.g. insurance and inventory
systems). Prior art references can be found in many diverse sources
(e.g. an Internet web site, a sales brochure, or a 120-year-old
textbook). There is poor tabulation of all the available references for
a particular topic (e.g. not all the insurance prior art is found in one
location). 
146
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is another prominent
administrative agency that has been critical of business methods. In
144. See, e.g., RICHARD HECKINGER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS COMPETITION: A DISCUSSION OF
SELECTED PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 6 (2007), available at http://bit.ly/MccQGE.
145. See 2003 Financial Markets Conference Announcement. Business Method
Patents and Financial Services, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, http://bit.ly/RngdN I
(last visited Aug. 14, 2012); see also America Invents Act: Hearing on H.R. 1249 Before
the H. Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet, 112th Cong. 3
(2011) (statement of Steve Bartlett for the Financial Services Roundtable) ("Given the
importance of the financial services sector to the nation's economy and infrastructure, it
is important that the patent system work for this industry. Currently, it does not. Instead,
the confluence of sector interoperability, frequent forum shopping, and a lack of quality
prior art-particularly in the area of business method patents-has conspired to leave
financial firms, from the smallest community bank, local credit union or insurance agent,
to the largest global companies, mired in meritless litigation over patents of dubious
quality.").
146. PTO WHITE PAPER, supra note 50.
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October 2003, the FTC published a report that has been cited by the
Supreme Court 14 7 and in legislative hearings. 148  In the report, To
Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent
Law and Policy, the FTC praised the PTO's use of additional levels of
review for business methods, reiterated the view that business methods
had traditionally been exempted from patentability, 149 and discussed the
difficulty locating adequate business method prior art.150
In 2004, The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published a
comprehensive analysis of the patent system called A Patent System for
the 21st Century. In that report, the NAS stated that it is "concerned
about trends in the application of the obviousness standard to business
method and genetic sequence inventions.1 i1  They also responded to
Allison and Tiller's 152 work suggesting that indicators of business
method quality failed to show any cause for alarm. In response to that
work, the NAS questioned whether
[t]he body of nonpatented prior art in the area of business methods is
so large or diverse that examiners are still missing a good share of it?
Does the examination process overlook some business methods that
are in common use but not documented in written sources?
15 3
To provide context, given the numerous alarms raised in response to
business methods, Table 1 provides a chronology of major events related
to business methods. As will be discussed next, this coordinated and
vigorous response generated a set of tangible administrative outcomes at
the PTO.
Table 1. Timeline of Significant Business Method Events
Year Event
The CAFC's State Street decision recognizes business methods as
patentable subject matter
Amazon.com asserts its "one-click" business method patent against
1 competitors
147. See Microsoft v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); KERWIN, supra note 11;
eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
148. See Comm. Print Regarding Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet, 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement of Richard J. Lutton, Jr., Chief Patent Counsel for Apple, Inc.).
149. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://l.usa.gov/ixpdVn.
150. See id. at 46.
151. NAS REPORT, supra note 128, at 62.
152. Allison & Tiller, supra note 49.
153. NAS REPORT, supra note 128, at 50.
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The first time the term "business method patent" was discussed in
legislative hearings in the House
The American Inventors Protection Act is enacted and provides a
prior use defense against business methods
The PTO implements the Business Method Patent Initiative to
2000 address quality issues concerning business method patent
applications
2001 The House holds a hearing specifically to address business 
method
patents
The Business Method Patent Improvement Act is introduced to
raise the obviousness standard for business methods
The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta holds a 3-day research
2003 conference on business methods and their impact on the financial
services industry
The Federal Trade Commission prepares a report, "To Promote
2003 Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and
Policy," that highlights problems related to business methods
The National Academy of Science publishes a comprehensive
2004 analysis of the patent system called "A Patent System for the 21st
Century" expressing concern over business methods
The Supreme Court describes some business methods as being
particularly vague and of suspect validity in eBay v. MercExchange
2007 The PTO institutes the Peer-to-Patent Project
The CAFC decides In Re Bilski and applies the "machine or
2008 transformation test" to evaluate business methods under a higher
standard than State Street
The Supreme Court states that business methods raise special
problems in Bilski v. Kappos
The America Invents Act is a comprehensive patent reform bill that
makes tax strategies not patentable and allows defendants in cases
involving financial business methods to challenge issued patents at
the PTO
V. THE PTO's RESPONSE TO BUSINESS METHOD FIRE ALARMS:
ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT LEVERS
The PTO invested significant resources 154  and promptly
implemented rules to address the concern exhibited about business
methods. In particular, the PTO implemented rules to address the issue
of patent quality related to this technology class, given the concerns
154. See Allison & Hunter, supra note 36, at 785.
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voiced regarding unduly broad business method patents. On March 29,
2000, the PTO announced the Business Method Patent Initiative, which
included industry outreach and quality programs.'55  The industry
outreach programs established "a customer partnership with industry, the
convening of a roundtable forum, and an effort to obtain industry
feedback on prior art issues."' 56  As stated by the PTO, the quality
programs provide steps to "enhance the technical training of examiners,
revise the examination guidelines and examples, and expand current
prior art search activities.' 57
Five business method-specific rules will be discussed next. A
remarkable aspect of these rules is that, as administrative patent levers,
they target a specific item of patent reform applied within the context of
a particular technology.158  This exercise of administrative policy is
singular since the Patent Act, as originally contemplated, is silent
regarding any sui generis treatment of technology classes. 159 Under the
general goal of enhancing patent quality, the following administrative
rules were implemented to deal with challenges unique to business
methods. The goal of improving patent quality in light of industry-
specific challenges provides the PTO with the legal legitimacy to enact
technology-specific regulations that attain the objective of issuing patents
that meet statutory criteria.
160
Given that prominent fire alarms related to business methods were
triggered at the highest levels of government, the PTO's response was to
identify the means for regulating this category of patents to improve
patent quality during the examination process. The first four
administrative patent levers addressing business method quality
originated in the Business Method Patent Initiative as either: (1) rules
pertaining to examination procedures, or (2) partnerships with external
parties to strengthen the level of prior art assessments during
examination. The last rule involving peer-to-patent was not part of the
Business Method Patent Initiative but falls under the second category.
155. Press Release, PTO, USPTO to Hold Roundtable Meeting on Computer




158. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7 (arguing for specific judicial changes to patent
doctrine to deal with diverse patent law preferences and context-dependent policy
outcomes).
159. Other areas where the PTO has created administrative patent levers include
software, biotechnology, and green technologies. A detailed account of these policy-
oriented rules is beyond the scope of this article. For a detailed assessment of PTO
rulemaking in these areas, see Orozco, supra note 18.
160. Patent quality primarily refers to issuing patents that meet the statutory criteria of
novelty and non-obviousness.
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A. Examination Procedures
1. New Expert Examiner Category
In the PTO White Paper, the PTO described a new category of
experts specifically retained to help examiners evaluate business method
patent applications. These additional experts are called Business Practice
Specialists. 161 According to the PTO, these specialists
will be pursued from industry to serve as a resource for examiners on
common or well-known industry practices, terminology, scope and
meaning, and industry standards in four basic areas: banking/finance,
general e-commerce, insurance, and Internet infrastructure.
162
These experts will assist with training efforts to help examiners stay
abreast of the latest developments in the various business method-related
fields of art. The only other technology field that uses this category of
experts is technology unit 2100-Computer Architecture and Software
Management. 1
63
2. Mandatory Field Searching
Traditionally, examiners assign a primary technology classification
code to a patent application, and the code assigns the patent to a PTO
technology unit for subsequent examination purposes. 164  Secondary
technology classification numbers are also assigned to indicate the prior
art databases that will be searched during examination. Examiners
evaluating business methods are required under the revised procedure,
however, to search a predetermined and exhaustive list of patent and
non-patent literature to assess business method prior art.165 Under these
rules, "examiners perform a mandatory search for all applications in
Class 705 that includes databases with U.S. patents, foreign patent
documents, and non-patent literature (NPL).', 166  No other technology
classes require mandatory searches of specific databases. 
167
161. PTO WHITE PAPER, supra note 50, at 21.
162. Id.
163. See Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry Management Roster, PTO,
http://1.usa.gov/RB5oTf (last visited Aug. 4, 2012).
164. See PTO, OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 16 (2011),
available at http://1.usa.gov/Qs2AL 1.
165. PTO WHITE PAPER, supra note 50, at 14-20.
166. Business method patent references must be searched in databases such as:
ABIINFORM, Business & Industry, Business Week, Business Wire, Computer
Database, Conference Papers Index, Dissertation Abstracts Online, Globalbase, Inside
Conferences, INSPEC, Interet & Personal Computing Abstracts, The McGraw-Hill
Companies Publications Online, Microcomputer Software Guide Online, New Product
Announcements/Plus (NPA/Plus), Newsletter Database, Newspapers, Financial Times
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3. "Second Pair of Eyes" Review
In March 2000, the PTO established the mandatory "second pair of
eyes" review for business method patents in Class 705.168 As described
by the PTO, "second pair of eyes" review
is a 'universal' review of all allowances in Class 705 with each
allowance taking about one hour. The purpose of this review is for
the reviewer to quickly flag issues that need further consideration by
the examiner and/or the examiner's supervisor. In fiscal year 2001,
the 'second pair of eyes' review in Class 705 resulted in a reduction
of the Class 705 reopening percentage by the Office of Patent Quality
Review (OPQR) to zero percent. For FY 2002, only one 705
application was reopened as a result of review by the OPQR,
169
All allowed business method patents are, therefore, subjected to an
additional review, and a larger than normal sample of these allowances
are then screened through the OPQR. 170  The "second pair of eyes"
review is a novel procedure that had never been implemented in any
other technology class prior to its application to business methods.'71
B. Partnerships with External Parties
1. Coordination with External Parties to Improve Search
Capabilities
Other unique rules implemented by the PTO to address business
method fire alarms include outreach efforts with external parties. One
rule seeks input from external parties to augment the PTO's non-patent
literature (NPL) prior art databases. The following are two separate
statements made by two high-ranking PTO officials during
Congressional testimony:
Indeed, our examiners have access to more prior art than ever
before.... While these improvements are encouraging, we continue
working with private parties to expand examiners' access to non-
patent literature. For example, last year we held hearings in San
Francisco and here in Washington on this very matter. I am pleased
Abstracts, New York Times Abstracts, San Jose Mercury News, Wall Street Journal
Abstracts PR Newswire, and PROMT.
167. A comprehensive search failed to yield any similar uses of mandatory searches
in other technology units.
168. Patent Quality Improvement: Expansion of the Second-Pair-of-Eyes Review,
PTO, http://I.usa.gov/OQZfEj (last updated Sept. 20, 2007).
169. Id.
170. Allison & Hunter, supra note 36, at 737.
171. Id. at 734.
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that, as a result of these efforts, organizations such as the Securities
Industry Association have come forward to help our office expand
access to state of the art information in their areas.
As part of our on-going Business Methods Patent Initiative, since
August 2000 we have tripled the number of customer partnerships
(from 10 to 31) with the patent community and the software, Internet
and electronic commerce industries. As part of these partnerships,
we are soliciting input from our customers on additional sources of
prior art that our examiners can utilize.1
73
This level of coordination with industry to improve the access to
prior art is in some ways singular to the business methods technology
class and is only rivaled by the software and gene patent fields.
74
2. Peer-to-Patent
The peer-to-patent project was an effort undertaken by the PTO in
June 2007 to open up the application review process to external
reviewers who may submit relevant prior art and statements to a patent
examiner. 175  Originally, this limited pilot project was undertaken to
examine software patents, but shortly after its announcement, business
methods were added to its scope. 76 As stated by the PTO:
Recently a group of academic and business professionals have
proposed a collaborative, online process in which members of the
public pool together their knowledge and locate potential prior art.
This pilot will test whether such collaboration can effectively locate
prior art that might not otherwise be located by the Office during the
typical examination process.
77
The project has been conducted on a purely voluntary basis, with
patent applicants choosing to opt into the peer-to-patent review process.
In exchange for volunteering, the applicant receives an expedited review
172. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet & Intellectual Prop., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Hon. Todd Q.
Dickinson).
173, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Operations and Fiscal Year 2003 Budget,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop., 107th Cong.
(2002) (statement of James E. Rogan).
174. See Orozco, supra note 18.
175. See Peer Review Pilot Program, PTO, http://l.usa.gov/MlOLuh (last updated
Nov. 8,2010).
176. PTO Announcement, Extension and Expansion of Pilot Concerning Public





process and, in theory, a more robust examination that yields a higher
quality issued patent.' 78 Although the PTO participated in the project, it
was conducted in collaboration with the Community Patent Review
Project of the Institute for Information Law and Policy at New York Law
School. 179
The second anniversary report of the peer-to-patent project stated
that 187 patent applications had been reviewed as of May 2009.180 The
PTO deemed the initial two-year pilot program a success and agreed to
continue the project. The extended period for receiving peer-to-patent
submissions into accepted applications ended on either February 3, 2012,
or 18 weeks after the latest date on which an application was accepted
into the program, whichever occurred later.' 81 This new program was
also expanded by including "Life Sciences, Telecommunications, and
Computer Hardware, and by significantly increasing the total number of
applications that may be accepted into the pilot.
' 182
Although it is not entirely certain that the PTO's administrative
patent levers caused a drop in patent granting for business methods, there
is some evidence corroborating this view. For example, the NAS report
provided evidence that the granting of business methods exhibited a
notable decline after the PTO implemented its Business Method Patent
Initiative.183  The overall trend for business method patent grants
increased but at a decreasing rate, from 1995 when 200 patents were
granted, up until the end of 2000, with nearly 1,000 of these patents
granted that year.184 In 2000, the PTO also implemented its Business
Method Patent Initiative and, in 2001, the grants of these patents dropped
178. See Daniel R. Bestor & Eric Hamp, Peer to Patent: A Cure for Our Ailing Patent
Examination System, 9 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 16, 17 (2010).
179. Id. The PTO, however, took effort to state its independence from the project in
the following disclaimer:
The Office and the Community Patent Review Project are independent entities,
and are not agents of each other. Peer-to-Patent is a non-Office website
developed by the Community Patent Review Project of the Institute for
Information Law and Policy at NY Law School. Peer-to-Patent is responsible
for the management of the Internet based review process by the public. The
Office does not set the membership or agenda, nor assume authority or control
over Peer-to-Patent or the Community Patent Review Project. Neither party is
authorized or empowered to act on behalf of the other with regard to any
contract, warranty or representation as to any matter, and neither party will be
bound by the acts or conduct of the other.
Id.
180. CTR. FOR PATENT INNOVATIONS, PEER-TO-PATENT SECOND ANNIVERSARY REPORT
5 (2009), available at http://bit.ly/kysJc.
181. PTO Announcement, A New Pilot Program Concerning Public Submission of
Peer Reviewed Prior Art, at 3 (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://l.usa.gov/OIsQOL.
182. Id.
183. NAS REPORT, supra note 128, at 57.
184. Id.
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below 900.185 By 2003, the PTO was granting nearly 800 business
method patents. 186 According to the PTO, the grant rate for business
method patents has markedly decreased, from 45 percent in 2001, the
year after the Business Method Patent Initiative was launched, to 20
percent by mid-year 2007.187 The lower grant rate reflects that fewer
patents are being granted despite a growing number of business method
application filings. In 2002, the PTO received 7,400 total business
method applications; by 2010, that number had increased to 17,231
applications.188
To respond to the quality issues raised in the various alarm
mechanisms, and to address the growing backlog of business method
applications, the PTO increased the number of examiners to process
Class 705 applications from 77 in 2001 to 197 in 2007.189 Yet, the PTO
has reported that, in 2009, the average pendency rate on the application
for a business methods patent until a final disposition was reached was
46.1 months (3.8 years). 190 However, this account has been challenged.
One scholarly assessment of financial method patents, which are a subset
of business methods, reports that total average pendency for this
technology area is above 7 years. 191 In the worst scenario, an anecdotal
account reports that an acting Patent Commissioner stated that the
pendency for business methods was ten years.1 92 To place this data in
context, a recent 2011 account of the average pendency for all patents is
33.7 months. 
193
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IMPLICATIONS
The PTO's deployment of administrative patent levers raises several
important administrative law issues. One issue involves whether, upon
judicial review, the CAFC would permit the current and future
implementation of administrative patent levers in other technology
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Wynn W. Coggins, Grp. Dir., PTO Tech. Ctr. 3600, Update on Business
Methods for the Business Methods Partnership Meeting (June 19, 2007) (PowerPoint on
file with author).
188. Class 705 Patent Application Filing and Patents Issued Data, PTO,
http://l.usa.gov/PvQ73Z (last updated May 5,2011).
189. Id.
190. Andrew T. Spence, Patentable Subject Matter, INTELL. PROP. ADVISORY (Alston
& Bird L.L.P.), July 27, 2009, at 1, 5, available at http://bit.ly/MWQY3w.
191. John F. Duffy & John A. Squires, Disclosure and Financial Patents, Revealing
the Invisible Hand 5, Working Paper (2008), available at http://bit.ly/OR2hZd.
192. See, e.g., Russ Krajec, Claiming Business Method Patents: Taking Advantage of
Long Pendency, BLOG (2012), http:/ibit.ly/MG IBTM.




areas. 194 This is a relevant inquiry because, in the past, the CAFC has
constrained the PTO's authority to engage in rulemaking whenever it
ventures into substantive 195 or policy-oriented' 96 rulemaking.
To answer these questions, a descriptive account will assess how the
CAFC would likely analyze the PTO's administrative patent levers if a
business method patent applicant legally challenges them. A prescriptive
solution is then advanced that suggests what might be a potentially
superior solution to the existing legal framework. This prescriptive
solution is justified under policy grounds due to four important reasons
including: (1) the legitimate role that administrative patent levers play to
regulate controversial technologies, (2) the technology neutral aspects of
the Patent Act, (3) the possibility of regulatory capture at the PTO, and
(4) the unintended consequences that unfairly impact some patent
applicants.
A. General Administrative Patent Law Framework
Administrative rulemaking falls into three general categories of
factual, legal, and policy-oriented rulemaking.1 97 The level of judicial
review applied to administrative actions depends on whether the
authority-granting statute mentions the scope of authority granted to the
agency and the level of review that courts are supposed to apply. 198 The
courts resort to administrative law defaults when the statute is either
silent or ambiguous about the nature of authority granted to the agency.
In such cases, if the administrative action involves either facts or policy,
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines these defaults.' 99
Because agencies are presumed to have high degrees of expertise,
findings of fact are scrutinized under Section 706 of the APA, which
states that courts are to review an agency's factual determinations using a
capricious, arbitrary, or abuse of discretion standard during informal
proceedings, or an unsupported by substantial evidence standard during
formal proceedings.200  At one point, the CAFC did not grant any
deference to the PTO's factual findings. The Supreme Court reversed
194. The PTO has signaled their desire to regulate other technology areas. See Press
Release, PTO, Peer Review Pilot FY2011 (last modified May 31, 2011) [hereinafter PTO
Press Release], available at http://1.usa.gov/i8ZOlb.
195. See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed Cir. 2009) (stating that Section
2(b)2 of the Patent Act "does not vest the USPTO with any general substantive rule-
making power").
196. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that public policy
concerns are more appropriately determined by the legislature).
197. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 104, at 284.
198. Id. at 279-80.
199. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 104, at 317-18.
200. Id. at 285.
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this position in Dickinson v. Zurko201 and required the CAFC to apply
Section 706 deference to the PTO's factual findings. The CAFC has
since applied, as a general matter, the unsupported by substantial
evidence standard to any of the PTO's factual findings. 2
Administrative rules that implicate policy are likewise scrutinized
under an APA default provision-in this case Section 706(2)(A)2 3-
which mandates a hard look review. Under hard look review, courts
hold that an agency is required, when implementing a regulation that has
policy ramifications, to take a hard look at and consider any significant
considerations against the rule's implementation.2 °4
Administrative rulemaking that carries the force of law is
scrutinized within the framework created by Supreme Court cases
Chevron2 °5 and Mead.2°6  In Chevron, the Court developed the
eponymous doctrine, which comprises two steps. Step one determines
whether the statute is clear regarding the agency's authority to issue
regulations that provide legal interpretations of the statute. If the statute
is silent or vague, deference is given to the agency's interpretation as
long as it is reasonable.20 7  The Mead case refined and narrowed this
analysis by holding that, in cases where the statute did not delegate
"authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law," a Skidmore level of deference applies.20 8 Under a Skidmore level
of review, a court reviews agency action based on "the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade.,
20 9
B. The CAFC's Framework for Assessing the PTO's Administrative
Patent Levers
In some significant aspects, the CAFC departs from applying
210traditional administrative law principles in its review of PTO actions.
201. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
202. This standard has been generally applied even though the capricious, arbitrary,
or abuse of discretion standard should apply because the PTO engages in informal
proceedings. See Benjamin and Rai, supra note 104, at 287-88.
203. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) ("The reviewing court shall-(2) hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.").
204. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 104, at 304.
205. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
206. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
207. Benjamin and Rai, supra note 104, at 296 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
208. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 230-31 (2001).
209. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
210. Benjamin and Rai, supra note 104, at 280.
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What follows is an attempt to predict how the CAFC would review the
PTO's administrative patent levers if they were to be challenged as
beyond the PTO's delegated authority. 21' Taking into account recent
case law, the author posits that it is possible that the CAFC would
examine the PTO's administrative patent levers under two scenarios.
These two scenarios depend on whether the CAFC would collapse the
analysis of administrative patent levers as an issue involving factual
determinations or as one of rulemaking that carries the force of law.
212
1. Analysis of PTO Rules that Reflect Factual Findings
As scholars have noted, the CAFC fails to recognize that the PTO
engages in policy-oriented decision making. 213 Professors Benjamin and
Rai analyze the Supreme Court case of In re Fisher21 4 to persuasively
make this point.21 5 In the Fisher case, the PTO rejected claims for a gene
fragment based on lack of utility216 by applying the 2001 PTO guidelines
for utility patents (the "utility guidelines").217 The utility guidelines were
drafted with policy concerns in mind to address overly broad genetic
information patent applications.
218
The Fisher Court, however, never acknowledged the policy
foundations underpinning the utility guidelines and instead chose to
review the PTO's denial of the relevant claims as simply a question of
fact.2 19 As stated by the CAFC, "Whether an application discloses a
utility for a claimed invention is a question of fact., 220 The CAFC then
reviewed the PTO's denial under the unsupported by substantial
211. PTO rulemaking has been challenged in the past by patent applicants who allege
that they have been denied substantive rights. See In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (concerning a patent applicant that challenged the PTO's denial of the patent
application based on the applicant's unreasonable and undue delay in prosecution); Tafas
v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (challenging PTO's rules relating to patent
applications involving continuations and claim numbers); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (challenging the PTO's utility guidelines for assessing the utility of
gene-related patents).
212. See Benajmin and Rai, supra note 104, at 305-06.
213. Id. at 306.
214. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
215. See Benajmin and Rai, supra note 104, at 305-06.
216. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (requiring that a patentable invention be "useful").
217. The 2001 utility guidelines can be seen as technology-specific and policy
oriented administrative patent levers in the field of biotechnology. For a more detailed
account of administrative patent levers in biotechnology, software, and green technology,
see Orozco, supra note 18.
218. Professors Benjamin and Rai state that the PTO instituted the utility guidelines in
response to being denied the ability to address overreaching genetic information patents
under the obviousness standard. See Benjamin and Rai, supra note 104, at 307.
219. See ln re Fisher, 421 F.3dat 1372.
220. Id. at 1369.
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evidence standard discussed in In re Zurko.22 1 In the end, the CAFC held
that the PTO had met the burden imposed by administrative law
principles. Nevertheless, the CAFC reiterated that the PTO's utility
guidelines were simply advisory and could "be given judicial notice to
the extent they do not conflict with the statute."
222
If any of the business method administrative patent levers were
challenged due to a patent application denial, it is possible that the CAFC
would ignore the public policy aspects of the rules altogether. The
CAFC may instead confine the issue as one involving a statutory matter,
such as a rejection of the patent application on the grounds of
obviousness or lack of novelty, as done in Fisher. 223 Business method
administrative levers are largely procedural and are used to improve
examination and availability of prior art; therefore, any denial of a
business method application founded on its use would likely meet the
substantial evidence standard of In re Zurko as long as the issue was
narrowly confined to a factual question involving prior art. This
outcome would be undesirable, however, because it would sidestep the
central issue of administrative patent levers being used as policy
instruments that address technology-specific issues and would
necessitate an altogether different standard of review.
2. Analysis of PTO Rules Having Legal Effect
If the CAFC categorizes the PTO's administrative patent levers as
rules carrying the force of law, the CAFC would likely embark on the
procedural versus substantive analysis adopted in Tafas v. Doll.224 As
often stated by the CAFC, the PTO lacks substantive rulemaking
authority. 25 According to the CAFC, any rules that veer into substantive
territory are beyond legality and the bounds of delegated authority
granted to the PTO by the Patent Act under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2). In
relevant part, Section 2(b)(2) states that the PTO may
221. Towards the very end of the opinion, the court addressed the policy arguments
raised by the PTO and its amici. The court, in a telling manner, stated that the concerns
were "public policy considerations which are more appropriately directed to Congress as
the legislative branch of government, rather than this court as a judicial body responsible
simply for interpreting and applying statutory law." In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378.
222. Id. at 1372 (quoting EnzoBiochem v. Gen-Probe, 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
223. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
224. See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
225. The CAFC stated that "[we] agree with the district court that § 2(b)2 'does not
vest the USPTO with any general substantive rulemaking power."' Id. at 1352 (quoting
Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 811 (E.D. Va. 2008)).
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establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which... (A) shall
govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office; ... (C) shall
facilitate and expedite the processing of patent applications,
particularly those which can be filed, stored, processed, searched, and
retrieved electronically... (D) may govern the recognition and
conduct of agents, attorneys, or other ersons representing applicants
or other parties before the Office ....
In Tafas, the CAFC did not provide a bright-line test for
determining when a rule is either procedural or substantive. As scholars
and the courts recognize, this is a difficult issue because rules at times
combine elements of procedure and substance.227 Alternatively, as stated
by Professor Arti Rai, "[S]ubstance and procedure exist on a
,,228spectrum. However, the CAFC did endorse an earlier test mentioned
in the D.C. Circuit case of JEM Broad Co. v. FCC.229 In JEM v. FCC, an
administrative rule was deemed substantive when it "changed the
substantive standards" applied to applicants appearing before the
administrative agency.230 But the more critical consideration in JEM v.
FCC for finding that the administrative rule in question was procedural
involved whether the rule would "foreclose effective opportunity to
make one's case on the merits.,,231 Because the FCC rules in question in
JEM v. FCC did not foreclose the opportunity to apply for FCC licenses,
the D.C. Circuit Court held that the rules were procedural, as opposed to
substantive. Quoting the D.C. Circuit, the CAFC in Tafas endorsed the
related position that procedural patent rules arise in cases involving
''agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of
parties, although [they] may alter the manner in which the parties present
themselves or their view points to the agency.,
232
In Tafas, the CAFC held that all four of the rules promulgated by
the PTO and challenged by the appellees were procedural in light of this
framework. Even though it was acknowledged that the four rules would
affect the substantive rights of patent applicants by making it more
burdensome to apply for a patent,233 the Court held:
226. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
227. See Brief for Intellectual Property, Administrative Law, and Public Health
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants, Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652
(E.D. Va. 2008).
228. Rai, supra note 15, at 2056.
229. JEM Broad Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
230. See id. at 327.
231. Id. at 328 (quoting Lamoille Valley R.R. Co. v. ICC, 711 F.2d 295, 328 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)).
232. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting JEM, 22 F.3d at
326).
233. Two of the rules-Rules 78 and 114-related to continuation applications and
requests for continued examination and required applicants to file petitions if the
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[W]e conclude that the Final Rules challenged in this case are
procedural. In essence, they govern the timing of and materials that
must be submitted with patent applications. The Final Rules may
"alter the manner in which the parties present ... their viewpoints" to
the USPTO, but they do not, on their face, "foreclose effective
opportunity" to present patent applications for examination.
234
Applying this framework, a strong argument can be made that all
five of the business method administrative patent levers are procedural.
A straightforward case can be made that the three examination rules,
235
the rule extending prior art through external partnerships, and the peer-
to-patent process are regulations that govern examination "proceedings
in the office" with the goal of improving the availability of prior ar236
In addition, even though all of these rules might make it more
burdensome for business methods applicants, none of them "foreclose
effective opportunity to present the patent application for
examination.
' 237
Under Tafas, the next step applied by the CAFC to assess the
legality of the PTO's procedural rulemaking involves applying Chevron
deference to the PTO's interpretation of the provisions of the Patent Act
that relate to "proceedings in the Office." The key question at this point
is "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue"
because then "the question for the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute." '23 8 In Tafas, all but
one of the rules survived this level of analysis. The invalidated rule
required applicants to furnish additional disclosures if they submitted
more than two continuation applications. The Court found that this rule
added a requirement to the Patent Act that unambiguously spelled out the
specific and exclusive requirements for filing patent continuations under
Section 120 of the Patent Act.239 Because the statutory provision dealing
applicant wished to pursue more than a certain amount of applications. Rules 75 and 265
require applicants who submit more than more than a certain number of claims to provide
the examiner with information in an examination support document. In his dissent in the
Tafas case, Judge Rader views all of these rules as impermissibly infringing on the
substantive rights of the applicants, in contravention of the PTO's procedural rulemaking
authority, and in opposition to language in various sections of the Patent Act.
234. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing JEM Broad Co. v.
FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
235. See supra Part V (involving the new examiner category, mandatory field
searching, and second pair of eyes review).
236. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
237. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
238. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
239. Section 120 states:
An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by
the first paragraph of section 112(a) . . .of this title in an application previously
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with this issue was found to be clear and unambiguous, the PTO's
interpretation of the statute was not afforded Chevron deference, and the
rule was declared invalid. Each business method patent lever is assessed
next in relation to the Patent Act to determine if they contravene the
statute or provide an unreasonable interpretation of it.
Because business method administrative patent levers relate to the
examination process, 35 U.S.C. § 131 is the central statutory provision in
the Patent Act concerning the examination process that would be
analyzed to assess their legality. The section, titled "Examination of
Application," states: "The Director shall cause an examination to be
made of the application and the alleged new invention; and if on such
examination it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the
law, the Director shall issue a patent therefore., 240 Given the extremely
broad and ambiguous language, it is unlikely that any of the business
method administrative patent levers would be viewed as unreasonable
interpretations of Section 131. Applying Chevron deference, the rules
would, therefore, likely stand as permissible methods for conducting the
examination under Section 131.
The rules are largely procedural in nature and meant to increase the
level of patent quality by making the process more rigorous and reducing
the possibility of granting patents that should never have been issued. As
such, they fall squarely within the authority defined by 35 U.S.C.
§ 2(b)(2). The only challenge that might arise under this statutory
provision involves the requirement that the PTO "shall facilitate and
expedite the processing of patent applications.' ' 241 As mentioned earlier,
the patent levers are associated with longer delays involving patents in
Class 705. This fact alone, however, would not likely be enough to
render the levers invalid because, as pointed out in Tafas, the courts will
not invalidate agency action that makes it more cumbersome to comply
242with regulations and that, in this case, would result in delay.
The only rule that might conflict with additional statutory
provisions in the Patent Act is the peer-to-patent rule. The PTO,
however, was careful in implementing the rule so it complied with the
filed in the United States, or as provided by section 363 of this title, which is
filed by an inventor or inventors named in the previously filed application shall
have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the
prior application, if filed before the patenting or abandonment of or termination
of proceedings on the first application or on an application similarly entitled to
the benefit of the filing date of the first application and if it contains or is
amended to contain a specific reference to the earlier filed application. ...
35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
240. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006).
241. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(c) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
242. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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existing statutory framework. First, the PTO asserts its authority to enact
peer-to-patent under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(1 1). That provision provides that
the PTO "may conduct programs, studies, or exchanges of items or
services regarding domestic and international intellectual property law
and the effectiveness of intellectual property protection domestically and
throughout the world," and 15 U.S.C. § 1525, which provides that the
PTO "may engage in joint projects, or perform services, on matters of
mutual interest, the cost of which shall be apportioned equitably., 243 The
PTO conducts peer-to-patent in a limited pilot capacity in conjunction
with New York Law School as part of a program of study.244 The
statutory authority related to "programs" and "studies" suggests a more
theoretical or academic exercise than what is currently achieved via the
peer-to-patent project. However, the statutory language does not
explicitly restrict "programs" or "studies" in this manner and is likely to
be afforded Chevron deference as a reasonable interpretation of
§ 2(b)(1 1) of the Patent Act.
Peer-to-patent also requires patent applicants participating in the
program to waive 37 C.F.R. 1.99(d), which provides that a third party's
prior art "submission under this section shall not include any explanation
of the patents or publications, or any other information., 245 The peer-to-
patent program complies with provisions in the Patent Act concerning
third-party objections and submissions of prior art. Section § 122(c) of
the Patent Act states
The Director shall establish appropriate procedures to ensure that no
protest or other form of pre-issuance opposition to the grant of a
patent on an application may be initiated after publication of the
application without the express written consent of the applicant.
In fact, the PTO only accepts volunteers to participate in the limited
peer-to-patent pilot program, and consent is required from all volunteers
243. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(1 1) (2006 & Supp. 2011); 15 U.S.C. § 1525 (2006).
244. See PTO Press Release, supra note 194.
245. Id. Peer-to-patent falls within the "new governance" movement, which stresses
transparency and a greater role for non-state actors in government proceedings. See Neil
Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The Localization of
Regulation, 36 J.L. & Soc'Y 145, 146, 150 (2009) (U.K.); David L. Markell, The Role of
Spotlighting Procedures in Promoting Citizen Participation, Transparency and
Accountability, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 425, 429 (2010) (discussing the new
governance mechanism of environmental regulation known as the North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), which allows citizens to submit
allegations of environmental law violations). Professor Markell states: "The citizen
submissions process is an example of a "fire alarm" mechanism in that citizens initiate
the process through the filing of a submission with the CEC Secretariat." Id. at 430.
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who participate.246 The consent form requires that the applicant allow
third parties to submit prior art references that explain the basis of
opposition to the application.247
C. A Normative Solution
This section offers a normative solution squarely recognizing that
traditional administrative law principles ought to apply when courts
review the PTO's actions. 248 As a prescriptive matter, the CAFC should
recognize that, similar to the PTO's utility guidelines, the business
method administrative patent levers are policy-oriented. Because the
rules are primarily procedural, the rules are not actions that carry the
force of substantive law, as discussed in the previous section. Even if
they were substantive, however, it is still arguable that the courts should
extend the appropriate level of deference to the PTO by applying the
traditional administrative review called for under Skidmore.
249
Although there is no clear line between legal and policy actions,250
administrative action that responds to statutory vagueness by imposing a
value judgment indicates action akin to policymaking. Scholars have
also identified ways that the courts and PTO engage in policymaking
when they target specific technologies in response to unique and
technology-specific challenges. 1 These value judgments, which also
characterize business method administrative patent levers, clearly reflect
PTO policymaking. Because administrative patent levers reflect policy
judgments, they fall in an entirely different category of review under
established administrative law doctrine.
The recommended alternative to the current administrative law
quagmire252 is for the courts253 to explicitly recognize that the PTO
246. Press Release, PTO, Pilot Concerning Public Submission of Peer Reviewed Prior
Art, at 1 (2007), available at http://l.usa.gov/N7oH8n.
247. Id. at 4.
248. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 104, at 271-72; Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating
Patents, 2010 SuP. CT. REv. 275 (2010).
249. If any of the administrative patent levers were deemed substantive, the courts
should apply Skidmore deference because this deference applies as a default except when
"it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority." Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226-27.
250. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 104, at 302.
251. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7; Benjamin & Rai, supra note 104, at 303.
252. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 104, at 302.
253. It is unclear whether the CAFC would overturn its precedent and explicitly
engage in this normative shift. The Supreme Court, however, might favorably endorse
this position. In the past, the Court has indicated that patent law should follow more
traditional administrative law doctrine. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150
(1999).
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engages in policymaking. Scholars have made a strong case for why the
PTO should be allowed to engage in policymaking, as most other
agencies do, 254 because the Patent Act is relatively broad, and virtually
all agencies are empowered and expected to engage in policymaking to
some degree. In this respect, the PTO should not be an exception. This
way, the PTO would be allowed to implement administrative patent
levers to overcome policy vacuums, political gridlock, statutory
ambiguity, and judicial lack of expertise and facts. The reviewing courts,
however, would still fill an indispensable role as reviewers of the
ultimate legality of their implementation.
A well-established framework exists for courts to review
administrative policymaking. That framework is informed by the APA's
gap filling Section 706(2)(a), which states that a reviewing court shall
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law. . .. ,255 Courts have applied this section to
agency policymaking by mandating a "hard look" level of review. A
hard look review, as mandated by the Supreme Court, requires that "the
agency must examine relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a rational connection between the
facts and the choice made. 256  An agency's failure to respond to
alternatives or any arguments that counter its actions would be deemed
"arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of Section 706(2)(A). 257
The leading Supreme Court case involving hard look review of
administrative decision making is Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance. 25 In the State
Farm case, the Court stated that a court is "not to substitute its judgment
for that of an agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made."' 259 Additionally, the Court stated that an agency rule would be
arbitrary and capricious if the agency entirely failed to consider an
254. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 104; Masur, supra note 248.
255. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
256. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
257. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 104, at 304 n.186; see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 356
F.3d 296, 305-07 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
258. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).




important aspect of the problem or offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency.26 °
It is possible that none of the business method administrative patent
levers would survive scrutiny under a State Farm line of inquiry. The
levers would not survive scrutiny under State Farm because there is no
evidence on the record to suggest that the PTO considered findings under
the novel two-part test advocated in this article. The first part of the
recommended test requires offering objective evidence that business
methods, particularly business methods in Class 705, presented a
challenge that merited special consideration. Anecdotal evidence and
conclusory assertions were offered that referenced litigation or media
accounts of egregious examples of special challenges involving business
methods.261 Yet, the PTO offered nothing resembling objective evidence
or a scientific study to justify the claim that business methods merited
262 sprcslspecial treatment. It is precisely this kind of evidence, however, that
should justify a policy decision. The second part of the hard look review
advocated here would assess whether the PTO failed to consider any
evidence that ran counter to the assertion that business methods were
unusually dangerous. There have been rigorous empirical studies which
show that this is not the case, namely the study conducted by Professors
Allison and Tiller.263  Yet, the PTO never addressed these contrary
findings before implementing their business method administrative
patent levers.
At this point, it should be noted that a hard look review would not
unduly hamper the PTO in its decision to implement administrative
patent levers. A legitimate concern is that the PTO lacks policymaking
expertise to rebut objective evidence that disputes whether the levers are
260. Id. at 43.
261. Kuester & Thompson, supra note 128, at 658. Interestingly, the PTO never
subjected any of the business method administrative patent levers to the informal
rulemaking process, which might have triggered some of the factual counter arguments
against the rules.
262. Id.; see also NAS REPORT, supra note 128, at 48 ("The claim that quality has
deteriorated in a broad and systematic way has not been empirically tested. Three
seemingly direct measures of quality are (1) the ratio of invalid to valid patent
determinations in infringement lawsuits, (2) the error rate in PTO quality assurance
reviews of allowed patent applications, and (3) the rate of claim cancellation or
amendment or outright patent revocation in re-examination proceedings in the PTO.
These indicators show mixed results."). In 2010, the PTO hired a Chief Economist who
is "responsible for advising the Under Secretary and the Administrator for External
Affairs on the economic implications of policies and programs affecting the United States
intellectual property system." USPTO Economic Research Agenda, PTO,
http://1.usa.gov/exrtgc (last visited Aug. 5, 2012). The office of the PTO Chief
Economist might be an important actor in future efforts to justify PTO policy actions,
such as the use of administrative patent levers.
263. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 49; Allison & Hunter, supra note 36.
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warranted. However, this claim is unfounded, especially because the
PTO has devoted resources to policymaking in the past. Most recently,
the PTO even hired a Chief Economist and support staff to guide its
policymaking agenda.264
From a policy perspective, administrative patent levers can be
important tools for administrative decision-making in response to unique
and legitimate challenges. Patent levers are sometimes required to
respond to policy vacuums left open by the courts and the legislature.
Certain technology areas clearly present unique challenges to the Patent
Office. However, if particular challenges such as declining patent
quality arise within a specific technology area, as alleged to be the case
with business methods, the PTO should present at least an objective basis
for these challenges to justify any technology-based and sui generis
rulemaking.
The purpose of hard look judicial review under Section 706(2)(A)
of the APA would be to hold the PTO objectively accountable in this
respect. This accountability is important given that the PTO advanced
scant empirical evidence, other than anecdotal accounts, to demonstrate
that business methods are generally of below average quality. 65 Apart
from the sake of harmonization and applying established administrative
law doctrine to the PTO's actions, vigorous judicial review of PTO
policymaking is important for the following reasons: (1) the important
implications for innovation and the economy (because the Patent Act is
technology neutral); (2) the risk of regulatory capture; and (3) the unfair
results and unintended consequences that may be generated by the use of
administrative patent levers. Each of these additional considerations is
discussed next.
Industry specific policy determinations are perhaps best reserved for
the Legislature and Judiciary to implement.266 As imperfect as it may be
to coordinate legislative adjustments to the Patent Act,267 the Legislature
has revised the Patent Act in the past to account for industry-specific
differences and objectives. For example, Congress amended the Patent
Act to provide defendants in business methods cases with the first user
defense.268 Congress also amended the Patent Act to account for the
264. David Kappos, Speech to the National Bureau of Economic Research (Apr. 20,
2010), available at http://1.usa.gov/OV6mgy.
265. Id.
266. See Orozco & Conley, supra note 6; In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
267. Especially when the reform goals are broad. See supra notes 5-6 and
accompanying text.
268. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
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particular needs of patentees in the biotechnology 269 and university
research270 industries. According to some commentators, the largely
general and technology neutral aspects of the Patent Act have
encouraged innovation across a broad swath of industries.271
A particularly striking example of how a broad, technology-neutral
interpretation of the Patent Act may spur the creation and development
of an important industry is in the context of biotechnology. In the
landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,272 the Supreme Court held
that living organisms can be patentable subject matter. The Court
endorsed a technology-neutral policy when it famously stated that
Congress intended statutory subject matter in the Patent Act to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man.''273 Some scholars argue
that this technology-neutral interpretation of the Patent Act spurred the
creation of an innovative and vibrant biotechnology industry comprised
of small entrepreneurial companies.
2 74
Evidence suggests that administrative patent levers may be subject
to political influence and pressure, particularly from powerful interest
groups.275 As a matter of national technology and innovation policy, this
pressure begs the question of whether administrative patent reform
should be primarily guided by technology-neutral principles or by
industry-specific concerns. The risk in the latter approach is that interest
groups with political power may have an advantage raising the requisite
fire alarms.276 For example, a particular industry group might initiate
congressional hearings that scrutinize a competing technological
269. The Biotechnology Process and Patent Protection Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
41,109 Stat. 351 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)).
270. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3018 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (1994)).
271. See Richard A. Epstein et al., The FTC, IP, SSOs: Government Hold-up
Replacing Private Coordination, Competition, 8 J. COMPET. L. & EcON. 1 (2012); cf
Robert M. Hunt, Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Phila. Working Paper No. 01-13/R (2004)) (arguing that a technology-neutral
obviousness standard in patent law encourages innovation in some sectors but not in
others).
272. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-18 (1980) (holding that living
organisms can be patentable).
273. Id.
274. Stephen H. Haber et al., On the Importance to Economic Success of Property
Rights on Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 215, 223 (stating that the
U.S. biotechnology industry is not rivaled in many other jurisdictions that do not provide
patent protection for living organisms).
275. Section 18 of the America Invents Act provides evidence of regulatory capture
of the patent system by the financial services industry.
276. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent Validity Litigation Over
Second Window Review and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn 't Fit All, How
Could Two do the Trick?, 157 U. PENN. L. REv. 1937, 1949 (2009) (discussing how larger
firms can tie up patents by using administrative challenges).
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industry. Unless the opposing industry has effective lobbying resources,
it might suffer negative repercussions manifested as administrative patent
levers. Under a public choice theory of politics, regulators are prone to
capture by well-funded industry groups. Direct evidence of this effect
can be witnessed through the addition of Section 18 to the America
Invents Act. This section has been widely criticized as a legislative
carve-out that exclusively benefits the financial services industry, which
now has a powerful weapon to challenge patentees asserting financial
business method patents.
Permitting the PTO to engage in technology-specific policy
277determinations may generate unintended consequences. For example,
Professors Allison and Hunter provide an empirical and detailed account
of how patent applicants strategically attempt to game the technology
classification system through creative patent drafting to avoid patent
applications from being assigned to Class 705, which would trigger the
business method administrative patent levers.278 The result is a situation
that unjustly rewards some applicants while hindering others without the
application of sound principle justified by any sensible reading or
interpretation of the Patent Act. Allison and Hunter's empirical analysis
also suggests an unconscious bias within the PTO towards classifying
279many business methods outside of the 705 technology classification.
The basic unfairness of this scenario is that some applications are
classified within technology Class 705 and undergo administrative patent
lever review, whereas other applicants proceed through a less rigorous
examination process. This outcome might not satisfy the arbitrary or
280capricious standard under a State Farm hard look review.
The subject of appropriate judicial review of administrative patent
levers is significant. The recently enacted America Invents Act delegates
policymaking authority to the PTO in a manner that would facilitate the
implementation of administrative patent levers.28' For example, the Act
includes a section that gives the PTO the authority to prioritize
examinations for technologies that are deemed important for American
competitiveness. 282 The PTO has indicated that it will expand some of
its administrative patent levers to other controversial and challenging
technology areas such as biotechnology, semiconductors, and
277. See Kuester & Thompson, supra note 128, at 678.
278. Allison and Hunter, supra note 36, at 787.
279. Id. at 737.
280. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
281. See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 26, 125 Stat.
284 (2011).
282. Id; see Cahoy, supra note 16, at 22.
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information technology. 283 Similar issues involving regulatory capture,
strategic gaming effects, and unintended consequences may be observed
in these important and emergent technologies.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article describes how the PTO implemented administrative
patent levers related to business methods. These administrative patent
levers represent a coordinated policy at the PTO to target a particular
technology class with the goal of improving patent quality during the
examination phase. This article describes how policymakers in all three
branches of government reacted strongly to the dangers posed by
business methods patents. The significant institutional attention,
preceded by constituent alarm, led to a series of norms and rules that the
PTO implemented to manage the quality of business method patent
examination practices. This behavior is explained under the "fire-alarm"
theory of regulatory change and positive political theory, whereby an
administrative agency responds to external institutional pressures and
actors. This article also highlights the important and visible role of
institutional stakeholders that provide expertise to help guide PTO
rulemaking.
This article also describes and predicts how the CAFC would
review the PTO's administrative patent levers. Ultimately, this approach
is undesirable because it does not recognize that the PTO actively
engages in policymaking. A normative solution is offered whereby the
reviewing courts apply a hard look review under Section 706(2)(A) of
the APA. This standard would require the PTO to offer objective
evidence that the administrative patent levers are warranted. The
standard would also require that the PTO address any valid arguments or
evidence against the implementation of these policy-oriented and
technology-specific rules.
283. See PTO Press Release, supra note 194.
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